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THE INSECURITIES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT: CASE STUDIES OF CHILD
SOLIDERS AND STREET CHILDREN

by

Victoria Leilani Busse

A Thesis

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

Major: Political Science

The University of Memphis

May 2015

ABSTRACT

Busse, Victoria Leilani. M.A. The University of Memphis. May 2015. The Insecurities of Underdevelopment: Case Studies of Child Soldiers and Street Children. Major Professor: Nicole Detraz.

After the Cold War, a paradigm shift occurred in the study of international conflict that led to a move away from traditional state-military centric security to make human beings the referent object of security instead. This paper uses the case studies of Sierra Leonean child soldiers and Brazilian street children to explore the links between human security and development. Children are already a vulnerable population, but they are made more insecure when they live in underdeveloped states. While poverty is a main causal factor in both these phenomena, other variables contribute to these social epidemics such as: weak governing structures, neoliberal economic policies, and societies too ill-equipped to reintegrate these marginalized children. This paper frames the two case studies within a human security narrative, and finds that most of these issues have structural causes that require long-term structural solutions.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

As the Cold War ended, a paradigm shift ushered in a new version of security, one that made humans its referent object. In contrast to the traditional state-centric security that dictated policy and most scholarly communities for centuries, human security emerged to rearrange priorities and critique traditional methods (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). This people-centered notion identifies security as more than the absence of conflict (Zambelli, 2002), while also incorporating ideas of sustainable development and a broad range of concepts that protect individual security (Theede, 2008). What links exist between security and development? More specifically, how is human security undermined by economic underdevelopment? Using case studies of child soldiers in Sierra Leone and street children in Brazil, this paper will describe the particular links between the insecurities they face as a vulnerable group and the underdevelopment of their prospective states.

Understanding the relationship between security and development is important as it helps explain why certain developing states experience greater abuse of human securities. “Underdevelopment undermines human security and insecurity threatens development,” (Howe & Sims, 2011, p. 334) as this quote shows the reciprocal nature of these two separate entities it points to the danger that exists when either security or development fails to thrive. The human security approach emphasizes the value of the individual, and how structural and political issues can make people vulnerable, especially children. The implications of linking security and development are useful in making relevant policy decisions, and explaining and understanding why issues like child soldiers and street children exist today.

Main Elements

Human security and development are two concepts that essentially frame this entire discussion about the vulnerable children who fight in armies or fend for themselves in the unforgiving streets. As introduced above, human security is a paradigm that puts the individual person at the center of its theory and application (Waisova, 2003). State security focuses more on external threats that jeopardize the borders and general concerns to the country, but human security sees threats that ignore political and geographical boundaries yet still affect people; such as disease, mass migration, or poverty. Human security addresses seven specific aspects of security: economic, food, health, environment, personal, community, and political. Additionally, human security focuses on two distinct aspects of freedoms from “want” and “fear” (UNDP, 1994).

These freedoms from “want” and “fear” fall into two disputing camps of human security that either prefer “broad” or “narrow” definitions and applications of human security (Roberts, 2005). However, despite its inclusive nature, human security is often critiqued for its vagueness and potential drawbacks in shaping policy (Paris, 2001). Human security works to empower and protect people, and ideally give them peaceful communities to live in that are rooted in sustainable development (Ogata & Cels, 2003).

Development is another important concept to explore. Its roots stem from economic notions of measuring progress (Rostow, 1960), and as decades passed and paradigms shifted, scholars and policymakers realized other aspects factored into measuring how a society “developed.” Historically, economic development has been linked with visions of peace and security (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002). While economic development is key to promoting the goal of human security, in sustainable development,

other concepts like quality or longevity of life are worth integrating (King & Murray, 2001). Ideally, infrastructure and development in society allows a state's citizens benefits of education or basic health care, but also opportunities to choose what sort of employment they would like to seek or where to live. Ultimately, organizations like the United Nations, see human security and development as the means to reverse massive problems like poverty and conflict (Zambelli, 2002).

For the purposes of this paper, "children" are defined as individuals under the age of 18. "Child soldiers" are children who are forcibly or voluntarily recruited to armed forces and used in a variety of roles, ranging from spies to front line combatants, during hostile encounters (Pendersen & Sommerfeld, 2007). The literature identifies several "push" and "pull" factors that lead children to a life in armed forces, most of which revolve around the need to survive created by their vulnerable status in abject poverty or victims of war (Francis, 2007; Skinner, 1999).

"Street children" is an umbrella term that includes children "of" and "on" the street. Those children "of" the street are typically child laborers who find employment in the public space, but keep ties to home and return at night. Children "on" the street are those who live, eat, and sleep in the street, rarely if ever returning home (UNICEF, 2005). These children typically flee to the street for independence and freedom from the extreme poverty they hope to abandon (Landers, 1988; Offit 2008).

Methodological Approach

This paper is structured into chapters that focus on: human security and development, child soldiers, street children, and concluding thoughts and policy implications. Overall, it seeks to connect security and development through the examples

of the already vulnerable population of children, made even more vulnerable by their lack of security and development. Case studies of child soldiers and street children were selected to qualitatively exemplify the theory behind linking security and development. They provide opportunities for thick descriptions of a particular historical example that can be situated to best support theoretical discussions (Baglione, 2012; Marsh & Stoker, 2010).

Additionally, poverty and violence were other variables present in both literature and the unique countries' histories. Sierra Leone was selected for a case study on child soldiers because of its fairly recent 11-year civil war, which employed thousands of child soldiers. Key leaders in this war were even brought to prosecution in the International Criminal Court because of their abuse of the security and rights of these children (HRW, 2007; Jang, 2012). Brazil was chosen as a case study on street children because of its infamous history of street children, and the abuse they suffer at the hands of their own compatriots. Brazil has one of the worst income distribution percentages in their world (The World Factbook, 2014), and these children come from the poorest parts of the slums.

For both of these cases, literature was robust in already establishing historical context for poverty and economic and social inequality. Both states represent more extreme examples of the worst abuses of children's insecurity, although in different circumstances, continents, and cultures. While the cases are different enough, as one deals with soldiers in a warzone and the other concerns itself with poor street kids, they both orbit around the common theme of economic underdevelopment, which is usually most evidenced by extreme poverty. There are other causal variables unique to each state,

such as corrupt governments, violence, conflict, and societies ill-equipped for progressive change (Achvarina & Reich, 2006; Chelala & de Roux, 1994; Rodwell & Cavalcanti, 1998; Skinner, 1999).

Chapter Outlines

The remaining chapters will introduce in detail the histories and concepts of human security and development. Chapter 2 focuses on security and development's origins, progress, shifting paradigms, and the overlap between the distinct ideas. It will also introduce other debates central to understanding the context of child soldiers and street children. Discussion about violent conflict and its motivating "greed versus grievance" debates (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998), poverty, neoliberal economic structures, and the supporting role non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play in helping "fill the gaps" left by neoliberal policies. This chapter concludes with a discussion about the nature of vulnerable groups and how children fall into that category distinctly.

Chapter 3 focuses on the phenomenon of child soldiers and how they are negatively affected by underdevelopment. "Push" and "pull" factors will be explained in detail, all of which will be framed in security and development contexts. Sierra Leone and its patrimonial government will provide historical examples of structural causes that led to the abuse of the children's securities.

Chapter 4 introduces the topic of street children and how economic underdevelopment, exacerbated by neoliberal policies, and extreme income inequality helped create the backdrop to this phenomenon. The factors that push children to the street, especially poverty, will be further explored and framed in the security and development discussion.

Chapter 5 will briefly summarize the main findings of the paper, and offer analyses of the implications of linking security and development. It will also suggest potential solutions to these global topics that endanger these particularly vulnerable populations, and address benefits and drawbacks that can influence policy.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

At the end of the Cold War, there was a paradigm shift away from traditional state-centric ideas of security and a move towards a more individually minded version of human security. Since the creation of international documents that promulgate human security, the international community has striven to manifest several levels of security for all people. There is certainly a large debate over what security is, and how broadly and narrowly to define it. The discourse around human security shifts attention towards individuals, and many scholars and policymakers have connected security with the idea of development in varying degrees over the past several years (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). This paper argues that the links between security and development are strong, and shows this through the example of child soldiers and street children. When socio-economic inequalities prevail and individuals experience insecurity, marginalized groups suffer, especially children. The subsequent chapters will explore the relationships between these children and underdevelopment, but first we must examine the connections between security and development. What is security, and how have our understandings of it shifted over time? What is development, and how have our understandings of it shifted? What meaningful conclusions can we draw by connecting security and development?

State Security

For the vast majority of human history, the state has decided what stipulates security concerns, which usually circulate around political themes related to the state itself, authority, legitimacy and sovereignty. Disciplines rooted in War Studies and Military History dictated international relations and foreign policy, as states engaged with each other through the centuries with the theoretical concepts of Hobbes, Clausewitz, and

Thucydides leading both Realist scholarly works and policy-makers to center stage (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). The classic Realist discipline favors the state's self-interest above all, and security is defined by how well the state can either maintain or overwhelm the "balance of powers" with which it engages (Morgenthau, 1973; Thucydides, 1972). Depending on the vein of realism, the state is not only the referent object of security but also responsible, via military power, for maintaining or further expanding that security through new conquests. As the primary actor it makes all decisions regarding security, and typically views threats in the form of external forces to be conquered with military power. For centuries, the military-state centric approach to security dominated the international scene, and while concepts such as "human security" were not unheard of, these wider versions of security did not gain a foothold until the 1980s and 1990s with the end of the Cold War (Buzan & Hansen, 2009).

State Security and Its Critiques

While state security concerns such as war or terrorism are certainly dangerous, the struggles of everyday life can pose more fatalistic threats to the very survival and wellbeing of humankind. With this understanding of unconventional threats to human life, a wider and deeper approach to defining security unfolded, slowly beginning after 1945 (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). While individualism and the idea of the person inherently possessing autonomy apart from the state is an old concept, especially purported during the Enlightenment and through liberalism's enduring doctrines, its influence in shaping security was overshadowed by military-minded and state-centered paradigms. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new era of security ushered in debates that re-conceptualized security by broadening and widening the concept of security away from

the classic explanations in order to make humans the primary referent object of security rather than the state¹ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). New non-military security threats like refugee flows, resource scarcity, environmental degradation, and widespread underdevelopment, forced the UN to redefine all aspects of security that affect human beings (Waisova, 2003).

Acceptance of the notion of expanding and deepening “security” from its traditional state-centric base progressed slowly, even though the first indication of a legitimate move towards extending the security solely focused on the state border to individual human beings was seen in the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues’ report called “Common Security” in 1982 (ICDSI, 1982). This served as the precursor to subsequent security models that criticized military and geopolitical concepts, and emphasized the importance of society’s individual people’s wellbeing (Zambelli, 2002).

Human Security

While the first mention of a human-centric concept of security was made in “Common Security” in 1982, “human security” was not officially coined until the publication of the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report. The UNDP report outlined the concept of “human security” through the strong institutional base of the United Nations, which proved the UN to be an integral part in shaping discourse and transitioning the orientation of security to an entirely new level of analysis in individuals (Zambelli, 2002). Human security has a distinct advantage among the

¹Mainstream political theory could not fully explain the collapse of the USSR, and this theoretical vacuum allowed several Constructivist approaches (including Feminism, Human Security, Post-colonialism, etc.) the opportunity to engage in scholarly and political spheres previously unavailable (Buzan & Hansen, 2009).

varying security approaches since its origin links directly to the United Nations and a hive of political-activist and academic agendas, all of which gave it a platform of legitimacy and attention (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). In its outline of human security, the UNDP (1994) report highlights seven categories that can threaten human security, which include: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. These broad categories encompass a wide variety of threats, and have led to many debates concerning the efficacy of a broad versus narrow definition of “human security” (Roberts 2005; Waisova, 2003).

The UNDP’s Human Development Report defines human security as: “[understanding] security first and foremost as the prerogative of the individual, and links the concept of security inseparably to ideas of human rights and dignity to the relief of human suffering” (UNDP, 1994, p. 17). As the definition shows, the notion of human security sets itself apart in that it addresses issues of aggression, violence, and war from an individualistic perspective, which in juxtaposition to the traditional state-centered approach is quite the opposite. This is a clear shift in the level of analysis, as human security adopts the perspective of the individual when identifying and combatting threats to security. The state-centered lens of security views these issues as threats posed against the physical and political entity of the state itself, including its citizens. Whereas, a human security approach sees these threats at the individual level regardless of the state in which the individual lives (Waisova, 2003). Human security issues know no borders, as disease or massive forced population movements exemplify, so while the concept does focus on individual security, it still supports and builds upon state security. The state is

the main protector of its citizens, and human security fortifies the claim of “sovereignty as responsibility,” which argues that the state should prioritize providing for its people because it is their sovereign. While still promoting state security, human security’s broader range allows for more scholarly and activist type authorities to adopt decision-making roles (Ogata & Cels, 2003). While the state is still the main decision-maker even in matters of human security², it now shares the role of political influencer at local and global levels with groups like technical experts and scholars, non-governmental organizations, and humanitarian organizations (Buzan & Hansen, 2009).

The UNDP report explicitly identifies that there are two aspects to human security; the first, freedom from “fear,” seeks to protect individuals from long-standing perils like hunger, disease, and repression. The second aspect, freedom from “want,” seeks to protect from sporadic and destructive events in daily life at all levels of society, regardless of lack or abundance of income and development. The ultimate goal is to promote sustainable development for current and future generations that leads to human security rooted in freedoms from want and fear (MacArthur, 2008; UNDP, 1994).

Broad versus Narrow

The notions of “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear” stem into the debates surrounding “broad versus narrow” interpretations of human security. Ex-Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, explained that human security

...in its broadest sense, embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom

² The role of the state in defining and protecting human security is a complicated topic. While it is an important piece of the story of human security, it is beyond the scope of this project to cover this completely.

from fear, and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment -- these are the interrelated building blocks of human – and therefore national – security (Secretary-General Press Release, 2000, paragraph 4).

The quote above speaks to the broad agenda of human security, and the eventual goals that it would achieve if properly implemented. While many scholars and policy-makers debate over the efficacy of a broad or narrow agenda (Chandler & Hynek, 2011; Paris, 2001), Annan emphasizes that every step towards a narrow goal, like protecting people from external threats, is also a step towards a broader goal of protecting people so that they feel empowered to act on their own behalf.

At the 2000 UN Millennium World Summit, the idea for an independent Commission for Human Security came forth, and in 2003 they released the Human Security Now report. Human Security Now defines human security as “the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment” (p. 13), and it calls on the international community to protect people from threats of all kinds that might hinder these freedoms. The Commission for Human Security states that human rights and human security are “mutually reinforcing,” since the latter indicates any rights that are being abused, and the former works as the guiding force in how best to promote human security (MacArthur, 2008).

The Human Security Now report has greatly contributed to the freedoms from fear and want debate. “Freedom from fear” purports a narrower version of human security, one that strives to protect individuals from direct threats to their security in the forms of conflict, food scarcity, treatable diseases, or other physical or political abuses to the individual. “Freedom from want” embraces a broader perspective of human security, which seeks to ensure less vital but still important aspects to individual security, such as

job programs, economic benefits during unemployment downturns, and bringing marginalized groups out of their peripheral social corners. The debate between broad or narrow approaches revolves around the vague and inclusive nature of what human security is, and what constitutes their abuse (MacArthur, 2008; Waisova, 2003).

The broad versus narrow debate has extended into the practical realm, as both Canada and Japan have incorporated human security agendas into their past foreign and domestic policies. In the late 1990s the Canadian model adopted a more narrow focus than the UNDP report presented, and limited human security to the “freedom from fear” model, while explaining that human development was “freedom from want.” These concepts are different, yet mutually reinforcing in that security provides protection from threats, and development in the state allows individuals the freedom to exercise choices. The Japanese model was more inclusive than Canada’s, and covered all threats to “human survival, daily life, and dignity,” which even incorporated human rights’ violations to transnational crime organizations and the AIDS epidemic (King & Murray, 2002). Both of these state’s agendas lay out several policy suggestions in sub-categories related to human security, all of which push for basic rights and freedoms for all peoples as well as democratic institutions that foster diversity, debate, and local leadership opportunities.

Human Rights and Human Security

Human rights and human security are separate but related concepts. When both are present individuals feel security to exercise the rights they have. However, some scholars feel that there is potential danger in undermining human rights’ agendas within broader framings of human security. Human rights stem from socially constructed laws that protect inalienable political, social, and/or collective rights, and tell states what they

are supposed to do (positive rights) and not do (negative rights) for the benefit of its citizens (Baehr, 1999). Human rights is more closely linked with the idea of human dignity, which requires people be treated as autonomous beings and live in societies that foster personal value, equality, ability to contribute in decision-making processes, and the pursuit of personal interests. The critique is that conflating these overlapping, yet distinctive, ideas undermines human rights largely because human security can relegate preexisting human rights discourse to a subset of human security. Good practice of human rights is reflected by the individual's ability to claim such rights from the state, whereas human security's progress is often measured by how policy addresses security concerns, which may or may not include all aspects of human rights (Howard-Hassmann, 2012).

While human rights focus on the dignity of people and respect of their inalienable rights, human security's primary concern is to extend the concept of security beyond political borders. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty document, the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P), and other such legal mechanisms give states authority to intervene when human rights abuses go unchecked (ICISS, 2001), and while this more directly pertains to human rights agendas, this idea of stronger state's intervening in such issues based on moral justification is important to connect with security concerns elsewhere.

Human Security and Its Critiques

While human security has received noteworthy attention within the international community, there are strong critiques to its design and implementation. One of the primary critiques of it is that its very definition is imprecise and vague. The UNDP report

and the Commission's document keep the idea of human security broad, which has benefits and drawbacks. These documents were crafted with the intention of expanding "security" to include categories well beyond traditional military threats to the state. The "logic of security" extended past national interest and nuclear deterrence to include "universal concerns," which focused on establishing cooperative global efforts to prevent conflicts, eradicate poverty, and bring states out from under the crippling weight of chronic underdevelopment (Buzan & Hansen, 2009; UNDP, 1994).

In a scholarly realm, the wider application can prove beneficial since it allows room for a variety of research topics, but in the policymaking world, critics claim that the vague definition complicates basic agreements upon what constitutes a security threat and what does not (Paris, 2001). Creating links with existing policies or programs, or securitizing a threat, can allow new funding sources and international attention previously unavailable; so a wider definition of security is particularly beneficial for the most unconventional threats, such as environmental issues (King & Murray, 2002). Since these definitions are so inclusive by nature, there is enormous potential to argue that nearly any discomfort to humanity could be regarded as a threat (Paris, 2001). Identifying what a "threat" is can prove problematic in the discourse between broad and narrow camps, and even more so between human security approaches and traditional state-centric approaches. When threats are perceived through the traditional state lenses, external menaces that hazard the welfare of the state's boundaries, population, and institutions are addressed through a military mindset (Trobbiani, 2013). Within the human security approaches, threats are viewed in relation to the individual and not just the state, but the levels of intensity or thresholds of a threat define the appropriate response by the state

and/or the international community (ICISS, 2001). Since only a small minority of conflicts are inter-state wars, the augmenting number of threats that come from within societies or otherwise fail to fit within warfare frameworks must be analyzed through different lenses (HIPTCC, 2004).

Distinctions must be made to give priority to some aspects of security over others, which ties into the “narrow versus broad” debate, otherwise policy will stagnate in the development phase of security (Paris, 2001; Roberts, 2005). Some scholars favor the notion of a “threshold” to measure the intensity of threats to human security, as well as human rights, along a case-by-case scenario. While this still leaves vague boundaries, it does allow a more flexible response to issues that undoubtedly cause more lethal damage than others. While human security’s primary goal is to shift state-centric security’s focus to that of its citizens, critics fear that these vague policies allow the international community to garner more authority through legal resolutions, such as the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine, and other mechanisms that would merit intervention when human security abuses go unaddressed by the state that harbors the threatened population (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002). The R2P document has been criticized because it inadvertently creates a hierarchy among state actors, with those better equipped and funded to interfere in security issues in weaker developing states (Trobbiani, 2013).

There are a myriad of critical perspectives regarding human security, and while they vary greatly, many are unified in the opinion that few of the existing applications of human security have successfully broken free from the policy-making discourse and its project-like nature, which often prioritizes the planning of programs over research. Many policy-activists have taken up the mantle of human security and have explored research

within the realm of applied politics and its pre-established categories, instead of engaging in critical theory building for its own sake. They call for a shift in motives and framing of human security in order for it to be more fruitful, which would include critical theory originating from scholarly realms distinct from the institutions that birthed human security. A main criticism of security includes the accusation of Westerner's myopic vision in seeing the insecurity of the rest of the world, which critical theory gladly deconstructs and analyzes when employed (Chandler, 2008; Chandler & Hynek, 2011).

Without more pressure to reevaluate the massive inequalities of capital and the fickle morality of states, human security is only an empty concept that symbolically acknowledges the gamut of issues that threaten humanity with palliative treatment (Chandler & Hynek, 2011). States are still the primary actors in international decision making, and they only seem to obey international rules when it is in their interest and benefit to do so, thus frustrating solidarity measures in the international community (Hill Jr., 2010). Again, the issue of state sovereignty resurfaces to question the efficacy of human security, since the international community cannot force states to comply with resolutions like R2P or the suggestions stemming from development reports of the UNDP. Despite states' tendency to sign documents or adopt human security discourse without totally changing behavior, human security did create a central rallying point for international actors to work together for humanitarian minded foreign policy goals (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). For instance, the "Ottawa Convention" Mine Ban Treaty of 1997 united the international community to completely ban the use of antipersonnel mines and to destroy existing ones, and although it has not had the complete support of all member states, its intention reflects a goal rooted in human security (ICBL, 1997).

Another critique sees the Western tendency to view human security subjects as “helpless would-be liberals,” implying that liberalism is the most preferred governing philosophy that all people would choose to follow given the option; and calls for an alternative approach to security that focuses on growing local leadership and sculpting assistance per unique needs in the community (Chandler & Hynek, 2011). There is a need to focus on communities and individuals for particular issues, and since human security is not a predetermined process, local input is vital for effective policy. International organizations, such as IGOs and NGOs, are important to the process as they bring attention, funds, and personnel to human security issues, but often transform impassioned local grassroots movements into professionalized and Western versions of activism, thus distancing local voices from the process (Duffield, 2014). Some critical voices accuse neoliberal economic agendas of usurping human security, and thus redefining risks and dangers to humanity for the purpose of gaining more power in dynamics between the developed and developing world. These weaker developing states become new political territory in which the developed states can exercise new international domination (Thede, 2008). NGOs will be addressed in further detail in regard to development programs in the next sections.

Some critics are more disenchanted with human security than others, particularly in that it has failed to live up to its promises, some argue it does not give power or voice to those who lack it already; but instead allows greater power to the leading states in the international hierarchy. Its nature has been depoliticized and now these stronger intervening countries base their actions around moral and ethical motives, but still do not allow the local people enough autonomy to voice their preferences or concerns over their

own “emancipation” (MacArthur, 2008). Most of these critics do not want to eradicate the notion of human security, but many distrust it because of its inclusive and vague nature, which allows the existing international leaders more power to intervene, and yet still fail to do more than “lid” developing problems or alleviate basic issues (Duffield, 2014). For the purposes of this paper, human security is the lens through which development will be assessed. Human security is only half the story, as its presence or absence is closely tied to the level of development a state has.

Defining Development

How exactly do we define development? Development is often seen working in tandem with human security, and sometimes human rights, but the notions are quite separate and distinct, although they complement and support each other (Howe & Sims, 2011). Development, as it is linked with security and peace today, came out of post-World War II and Bretton Woods’ settlements that established economic development as part of the discourse of national security. A large part of the motivation to connect economic development and national security took root in the perceived urgent need to halt Communism’s threatening expansion into territories that would engage with the US and her allies. In the years immediately following the end of World War II, neoliberal economic order which called for the spread of capitalism, steered development programs and loans that rebuilt Europe, and eventually spread to the rest of the world. International Monetary Fund and World Bank loans contributed to this spread, as countries needed funding to industrialize and develop. This process further pervaded into local culture by intentional and unintentional incorporation of more Westernized aspects of culture, politics, and economic organization into indigenous markets. Some critics feel that this

process makes “modernization” and “westernization” nearly synonymous as developing states adopt economic development plans from Western countries (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002; Duffield, 2014).

As its historical beginnings imply, development is typically measured according to an economic standard, which takes its roots in Rostow’s stages of growth based on the notion of linear development. His model explains economic growth based on five phases of varying lengths of time: 1) Traditional society, 2) Preconditions for take-off, 3) Take-off, 4) Drive to maturity, and 5) Age of High mass consumption. This first phase of “Traditional society” develops within limited knowledge of science and production functions, or what Rostow calls the “pre-Newtonian” world based on the attitude men had about the physical world before Newton and his contemporaries made paradigm shifting discoveries. The second phase of “Preconditions for take-off” embodies societies in transition as they accept the science and technology necessary to advance agriculture and industry. More often in history this phase was not initiated endogenously, but instead instigated by outside powers of more advanced societies, which catalyzed the process by which traditional societies would grow into the next phases, yet while still clinging to remnants of their old culture. The third phase of “the Take-off” sheds the old resistant methods and steady growth is established, finally allowing the growth of modern activity the status quo. In the fourth phase of “the Drive to maturity” the economy has an international presence and is strong enough to evolve beyond the original industries that powered it, and has the ability to produce anything it chooses. In the final phase of “High mass-consumption” the demand for consumers’ goods and services dictates the investment and production of the leading sectors. During this phase, a social welfare

service is likely to emerge as well. Overall, the idea of development here drives societies to maturity through modernization (Rostow, 1960).

Rostow's linear development established phases that assume industrialization is the only means through which economic growth can happen, and culture and society have the potential to impede this process. In his opinion, a developing state could industrialize and develop economically if it received a massive injection of capital and was properly guided by the public sector (Kuhn, 2008). His model was inspired by the Marshall Plan, which was used after World War II to rebuild Europe on loan, and despite some success with the stimulus of capital in war-torn countries, this method has received criticism for major drawbacks. Rostow built his argument assuming that his sequential phases would apply systematically to all countries, and only measures development based on GDP per capita, meanwhile neglecting the role that social structures play in fostering development. (Gow, 2005).

Rostow's approach was quickly antiquated, as other scholars, like Barrington Moore, rejected the notion that all states modernize through the same process. He argues that there are three distinct types of modernization, made unique by the class structural changes that accompany development. The first of the three types is "bourgeois revolution," in which violent revolution brings down the traditional landed elite and replaces it with capitalist democracy. The second is "revolution from above," in which the traditional landed elite kept its power during industrialization. The third type is "peasant revolution," which saw a revolutionary peasantry abolished the traditional elite, making way for modernization. In contrast, to Rostow, linear development is moved

aside and other factors included to explain the process of development (Moore, 1966; Wiener, 1975).

Over the course of 50 years, several different approaches to development have stemmed from modernization theories and critiques of its shortcomings. Dependency theory emerged in the 1970s to holistically explain development and underdevelopment among national economies in a growing global capitalist context, with concrete analyses of historical material. It points to underdevelopment as the result of an unequal relationship between states, in which one economy is clearly dominant. While it claims that states cannot grow to affluence along a single prescribed path, dependency theory splits into different camps concerning strategies to achieve development. Unlike liberal discourse, which fails to see the connection between poverty and wealth, dependency theory posits that poverty is the consequence of how wealth is produced (Duffield, 2014). Some dependency theorists receive criticism for failing to analyze inter-class hierarchies of power within the dependent state on the international scene, namely in how the elite who profit from capitalist enterprise engage with outside dominant states. However, when addressed, a main dynamic of contention is truly between the elite and the poor within the same state, while the elite from different states usually establish more common ground together (Friedman & Wayne, 1977).

In the 1980s and 1990s, a particular strand of liberal ideology, known as neoliberalism, came into mainstream literature. After the fall of communism, this neoliberal ideology presented an economic and political approach to development that emphasized the conception of freedom on private power (Thomas, 2001). The individual person's freedom is best displayed in his ability to make choices in the market. This

ideology believes that the market thrives most when the government keeps its distance with limited interference. While it celebrates the individual's freedom to choose in the market, it receives criticism for detaching state sponsored support in social sectors, like education, health care, and social welfare. Neoliberalism strips away the social safety net that the state would provide for its citizens, and places the responsibility of collective and social security outside the public realm and into the private sphere. Critics also frame the argument in Marxist terminology, claiming that neoliberalism is just an extension of the elite upper classes, or the bourgeoisie, profiting at the expense of those they exploit, the proletariat, by dispossessing and redistributing the proletariat's wealth (Harvey, 2005). As development theories evolved, human security overlap had an impact in the 1990s. The broader lens of human security is based on the risk of severe deprivation, and it depends heavily on the concept of poverty, which is historically only ever described in terms of income. But as the development literature above has shown trends moving away from that, human security does its best to encapsulate other factors to indicate the quality of human life (King & Murray, 2001).

In the 1990s, the UNDP report introduced the Human Development Index (HDI) a scoring system that uses three separate components to compare state's development, which are: GDP per person, life expectancy, and literacy. Reports have been released annually ever since its conception, and the results are used to shape policy on local and global levels to help properly develop countries according to UN standards (Lind, 1991). As the multiple progressions of development theory have evolved over time, the HDI system strives to measure development in a multi-dimensional manner. This lens sees development as growth plus change, and regardless of how change begins it inevitably

affects social and cultural aspects, so it is important to include these other factors in an analysis of development. This index works to measure the quality of life for the individual, extending the evaluation of development beyond GDP per capita like previous models. However, it is difficult to create a uniform and objective measuring standard for an analysis that ultimately judges states' development based upon the evaluator's preferences. Those who established which categories would be used as indicators of development and how they each weigh in the final average do not necessarily represent a perfect, or even universal, understanding of the concept. For example, life expectancy measures the quantity of life, but may not evaluate the comfort and ease of those years a person is living (Chowdhury, 1991). For the purposes of this paper, the definition of development will encompass traditional economic aspects, as well as factors that contribute to quality of life, like access to educational and employment opportunities, health care, and certain narrow aspects of human security like security to an individual's physical person. Since human security focuses on the needs of individuals, a developed state would ideally incorporate those aspects to ensure the protection of its citizens.

Development and Conflict

Understanding that economic, political, and social aspects are all affected with development, it is worth considering the more destructive negative repercussions of underdevelopment. When resources and benefits are unevenly distributed in societies that lack proper political avenues for debate or expression, human security can be jeopardized in several ways, from violence to a total lack of social services. In the wake of globalization's extensive reach and the subsequent exploitation of many once colonized states, the initial inequalities of resource distribution only seem to linger. The processes

of economic globalization's darker influence permeates into international politics surrounding how developed and developing states define security and approach solutions. Many scholars today focus on the insecurity that conflict exacerbates, especially when set in underdeveloped states, and while poverty does not necessarily induce conflict there are definite connections (Duffield, 2014). Seminal works by Collier point to empirical evidence that shows low per capita income to be a robust explanation of violent internal conflict (Collier et al., 2003; Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; 2004). Conflict is far more likely to occur when the state governing institutions are weak, large populations share grievances against the state, and the economic cost of fighting is lower than the cost of non-participation (Justino, 2009).

The "greed versus grievance" debate is an important concept in the development literature, as it attempts to explain motivations and opportunities for violent internal conflict, which necessarily threatens human security. "Greed" motivates individuals to participate in a rebellion because of the potential gains to be had should they be victorious, be it through looting valuable resources or eventual control of state power and revenue. "Grievance" calls people together to resist a perceived or actual felt injustice, which usually has a deep-seated historical link (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). It is important to note that while individuals engaging in violence must weigh the costs and benefits of participating, there is usually no real economic gain for average citizens. The charismatic leaders are those who profit most from such rebellions, as Sierra Leone's blood diamond trade and civil war illustrate, while large percentages of the population are threatened or abducted into service (Regan & Norton, 2005; Starr, 2006). Regardless of the motivation or circumstances, conflict retards development, and this is problematic (Murshed, 2002;

Starr, 2006). Social stability is an essential component in building a country in which economic and human development can thrive. Without these factors it is unlikely that governing state institutions will be strong enough to quell dissenting rebels through more peaceful channels of expression and resolutions (Murshed, 2002).

While economic problems are not the sole cause of conflict, as there are many poor countries that do not face violent internal conflict, policy makers have the tendency to reduce “conflict” to the struggle over economic resources. Conflicts built around social and cultural issues can prove to be elusive and difficult to resolve since there are no obvious entry points for policy intervention (Berdal, 2005), so neoliberal Western-centric ideology favors economic growth as the best solution to stabilize and recover weak poor states prone to conflict (Sobek, 2010; Starr 2006). While some Western powers fully support the idea of the market solving issues related to economic poverty and its connection to violence, critics point an accusing finger back to neoliberalism as the culprit in exacerbating the unequal distribution of wealth and resources in these developing states. There is an historical trend among many of the conflict-laden states that links them to colonial rule, which inevitably built social structures that favored one indigenous ethnic group over another, eventually setting the stage for weak governance and civil conflict after colonial power exited (Murshed, 2002).

Despite disagreements in methodology, most scholars agree that development helps reduce violent conflict (Duffield 2014; Kaplan, 1994), and many policy makers feel a sense of obligation to help weak underdeveloped societies out of the quagmire that ensues from the “lethal cocktail” of economic decline, dependency on primary commodities, and low per capita income (The World Bank, 2014), from which they

otherwise may not escape. While some developed states are willing to send aid, there are typically strings attached, and more often than not a reconstructing of local power dynamics and economic systems that reflect Western values and traditions, instead of indigenous cultures (Duffield, 2014, Starr, 2006). Part of this obligation to aid developing states, crosses over from international documents surrounding the abuse of human rights, such as the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), which justifies military and political intervention when a state abuses its people or cannot protect its people from natural or manmade threats.

As post-1945 doctrine would show, providing aid for war-torn and suddenly underdeveloped societies was not an entirely altruistic move for the US, as the ideological conviction that the American political economy of freedom would be directly threatened should it allow such a threat to persist (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002). Similar concerns were voiced decades later in a Human Security program written by a Canadian council, which speaks of Canada’s commitment to building a world that fights off these new threats to human security, and interestingly includes the realization that these threats “show no respect for national borders and inevitably become the source of our own insecurity” (Thede, 2008, p. 39).

While the global community recognizes the need to address human security and its threats, how actors decide to incorporate the idea of development is important to policymaking and action. What value is there in thinking of development as a security issue?

Securitizing Development

The act of framing an idea gives it importance and attention in the international legal world, and by securitizing the concept of development it gains status and legitimacy in the hierarchy of policy changes. In the realm of decision-makers, labeling threats under the umbrella of human security is no trivial matter. By incorporating an issue, whether it is a more narrow idea like climate change or a broad concept like development, it ultimately shifts political and financial focus, changes the kinds of questions asked about issues, and promotes different policies (Howard-Hassmann, 2012). Traditionally, these aid and development programs are injections of capital meant to bolster failing economies, build international ties of partnership, and help modernize recipient states (Helman & Ratner, 1992).

These programs are spearheaded by richer developed states, but the Global North increasingly wants to see the Global South embrace and initiate such projects for themselves. There is a complicated duality to the nature of neoliberalism's pursuit of stability, namely that it embraces conflict resolution and societal transformation according to its own Western standard. The Global South has been likened to a mirror that reflects the policy practices of dominant states elsewhere, and liberal peace is a systematic game of bending the will of states to cooperate with development assistance. In their shaping, these developing states are rewarded with the "carrots" of growing networks and chastised with the "sticks" of non-compliance, resulting in increased conditions to aid and potential economic isolation. So long as these developing economies follow the path dictated for them, they will continue to enjoy the benefits of

their Western patronage, but often at the expense of allowing foreign powers more authority in their own economies (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002; Thede, 2008).

While leadership of development assistance has spread into NGOs and other institutionalized entities, aid has been less politicized and strategic in exclusively supporting only Western political allies; yet it has certainly become more concerned with transforming whole societies for the economic benefit of investors (Duffield, 2014). The prevalent neoliberal critics of Keynesian and capitalist economics often overlap in the same circles that criticize development programs and their inevitable strings of conditionality, usually in the form of austerity measures. Neoliberalism, as an economic theory does not speak directly to human security, but in regard to the hegemonic economic order of capitalism. Laden in heavy Marxist tones, critics blatantly decry the abuses of major powers and their propensity to exploit or “dispossess” others of their labor and resources for their own benefit (Harvey, 2005). This more directly links to criticisms of Western-led development, and the inequalities it perpetuates, which can lead to vicious cycles of “underdevelopment undermining human security” and “insecurity threatening development” (Howe & Sims, 2011, p. 334; Poku, Renwick, & Porto, 2007). Critics are concerned with the fact that the vast majority of scholars and policy makers come from the developed world, and these decision-makers shape policies that are not always sympathetic to the needs and systems of the developing world, which are ultimately the targets for development programs (Duffield, 2014).

As mentioned earlier in the development section, the neoliberal framework favors a system that purports self-help while simultaneously de-investing in social welfare programs that primarily help marginalized groups. Often the state finds that its own

interests benefit when it allows non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to fill in the gaps that were left in the social welfare sphere. While the neoliberal system does not eschew the idea of these programs, it believes that NGOs and non-profits are best suited to care for this responsibility, which eventually leads to the privatization of social services through grants or loans (Wies, 2013). The theoretical differences between mainstream capital-driven liberalism and critics of neoliberalism are necessary to understand as the international community struggles to implement practical measures to meet tangible needs (Fisher 1997; Schuller 2009).

Much of the activist and NGO human security agenda pushes for empowerment of local leadership and participation in decision-making process by citizens. However, international authority often curtails local participation and impact by its professionalized structure and Westernized perception, and foreign funding eventually overtakes local management (Duffield, 2014). Once NGOs have strayed far enough away from their grassroots origins they have the tendency to shift their priorities based upon donor preferences, and in doing so lose legitimacy as their targeted constituency decreases in value over the pull of purse strings from distant funders (Epstein, 1996; Fisher, 1997). NGOs are becoming increasingly political, and many critics voice fears that these organizations, many of which once challenged state policies, must now conform to state agendas to continue receiving funding (Wies, 2013).

The idea of securitizing development has value as it strives to alleviate insecurities for those most burdened by chronic poverty, jeopardized livelihoods, and social marginalization. One of the core problems that perpetuates human insecurity is material insufficiency (Berdal, 2005; Sobek, 2010; Starr 2006) and this extensive poverty

is largely affected by global and local existing power structures that determine who enjoys security and who does not by defending the status quo power and wealth's distribution (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002). The 1997 UNDP annual report addressed quantitative and qualitative aspects of poverty, distinguishing between economic poverty, those living on less than US \$1 a day, and human poverty, those who were denied the choice and opportunity to live tolerable lives. These two forms of poverty do not always overlap, but when this combination of poverty and inequality exists it garners attention from international actors, as they fear the likelihood for conflict in such regions (Thomas, 2001).

Based on 2010 figures, extreme poverty confines 1.22 billion people to less than US \$1.25 a day, and 2.4 billion people to less than US \$2 a day, with even larger numbers for higher poverty lines (The World Bank, 2014). According to the 2007 Human Development Report, only 5% of global income belongs to the poorest 40% of the world, while the richest 20% accounts for three-quarters of global income (UNDP, 2007). There is an obvious and unequal dispersion of wealth in the world, and international actors have recognized the need to send aid to alleviate and combat the threats that commonly come with it, like hunger, disease, lack of education, and the absence of more women and minority groups in community forums.

In general, development brings stability to societies, which is an important pillar to upholding many aspects of human security, for instance, by providing peaceful outlets for political expression a government is more likely to spare a society from violent conflict through more democratic means (Murshed, 2002; Ogata & Cels, 2003; Sobek, 2010). When economies and livelihoods are stable and promote secure environments,

people are less threatened by everyday struggles. Once major debilitating problems like hunger, disease, or political unrest are addressed, other issues that make up additional tiers of security, like civil rights and job programs, can grow properly (Duffield, 2014).

In order for this type of growth to happen, so that both freedoms from “fear and want” are incorporated into human security agendas, it must maintain its focus on the people and their needs instead of the foremost political gains that benefit the state alone. Human security, by its very name, indicates a departure from traditional security norms, and hopefully this shift will bring tangible changes to how the international world works to improve living standards for all people, especially those frequently ignored. While it is idealistic to plan for a world where both freedoms from want and fear are commonplace, the narrow approach to human security is a more practical first step in rebuilding and developing many of the poorest states. If states saw individual citizen’s security as state security, agendas would strive to stabilize the people’s concerns first, and then the state, yet often people are only seen as a means to end when building up state power (Poku et al., 2007).

Vulnerable Populations

Vulnerable populations have been described as groups identifiable by “common race, ethnic group, religion, culture, political beliefs, or geography” that lack political or other means to address assaults or threats to their wellbeing (Gellert & Zwi, 1995, p. 995). As evidenced by international documents like the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the global community at large labels children as a particularly vulnerable population. The non-negotiable standards set in this document protect children’s rights in every aspect from health to education to legal and social services. The CRC reaffirms the

state's responsibility to provide for its minor citizens without discrimination of any kind (Bryant, 2009; OHCHR, 1989). While some scholars and policy makers notoriously lump "womenandchildren" together as a vulnerable group in need of special protection, it is arguable that fully developed adult women still retain more agency and rationale than young children with little life experience. Some feminist scholars seek to disconnect the compound grouping of "womenandchildren," as it infantilizes the struggles that women must battle (Afkhami, 2002; Hudson, 2009; Tripp, Ferree, & Ewee, 2013). Without discrediting the vulnerabilities and marginalization that women can face, that separation should also be made distinct for the sake of understanding and combatting the unique vulnerabilities of children.

In a 1997 study, researchers found that orphan rates were rising globally and most countries heavily affected were unable to respond to the problem effectively. While most children in Africa were orphaned because of HIV/AIDS and other health issues (Schenk, Michaelis, Sapiano, Brown, & Weiss, 2010), other studies have found that all children living in communities heavily affected by poverty and disease are seriously threatened in their development and wellbeing. These children form the grouping of Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC), in need of their government and local communities to help protect and grow them (Bryant, 2009). According to UNICEF, unequal resource distribution is a key component to problems like the poorest 20% of children in the world being twice as likely as the richest 20% of children to die before their fifth birthday due to poor nutrition. Concerning education in least developed countries, only 6 out of 10 children are likely to attend primary school, with even fewer continuing to higher levels, especially girls (UNICEF, 2014). These OVCs are not only vulnerable, but often

marginalized as they are pushed into the periphery of society (Kosa & Adany, 2007), either as the dregs of street life or as corrupted younglings no longer pitiable because of their exposure and participation in warfare. The remaining chapters will explore how these OVCs are affected by the dynamics of security and development.

Chapter 3: Child Soldiers

This chapter enters the scholarly discussion concerning the links between security and development, and shows their connection through the example of the insecurity of child soldiers in Africa. While poverty is a main factor that leads children into forced conscription, weak states and underdeveloped economies are variables that appear in this context as well. Exploring the connections between security and development through the phenomenon of child soldiers, this paper uses Sierra Leone as a case study. Sierra Leone's history of corrupt patrimonial governance, infamous use of child soldiers, and underdeveloped economy made it an ideal example in which to showcase the lack of security that leads to children becoming soldiers.

Introduction

What is a child soldier? The official UNICEF definition of child soldiers is: “children (boys and girls) under the age of 18 who become part of a regular or irregular armed force or group in any capacity, including in roles of cooks, porters, human shields, sexual slaves, messengers, spies, or frontline combatants” (UNICEF, 2001). The international community, namely medical and psychological experts and UN officials, also define “child soldiers” as children under the age of 18 who are “compulsorily, forcibly, voluntarily recruited or otherwise used in hostilities by armed forces, paramilitaries, civil defense units or other armed groups. Child soldiers are used for sexual services, as combatants, as forced ‘wives,’ messengers, porters or cooks” (Pendersen & Sommerfeld, 2007). These definitions are important as they distinguish the nature of child soldiering from the standard recruiting techniques and profile of adult soldiers. Much of the literature reasons that children are nearly always forced into

conscription, through a variety of “push” and “pull” factors that motivate them to join armies despite the danger associated with them (Skinner, 1999). While many of these “push” and “pull” factors surround familial ties, abject poverty is an overarching theme seen in the case of child soldiers. The relationship between economic underdevelopment and patrimonialism, in the particular study of Sierra Leone, proves a serious threat to the security of these children and the futures of their states.

General Discussion of Child Soldiers

Child soldiers are not a new phenomenon historically or culturally. While the context of war and culture certainly sets stipulations for the acceptability of employing children as soldiers, their historical presence from “boy soldiers” in the Middle Ages, to Native American 14 and 15 year olds joining their first war parties, to Sudanese initiations of boys into warriorhood at ages 17 and 18 show no single fixed chronological age for soldiering (Rosen, 2007).

Outside of the largely modernized West, many cultural norms in Africa define childhood in different ways and so argue that age limits as high as fifteen or eighteen are an extension of Western hegemony (Francis, 2007). Some argue that the very notion of “childhood” is a recent European phenomenon that developed in the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries as a social, not biological, construction. Others posit that childhood is a concept that is defined by social influences that contribute to his or her development, which could easily include social norms that validate children working at the age of 6, which in turn seems anathema to Westernized ideals (Francis, 2007; Hecht, 1998; Monforte, 2007). The “politics of age” is a complex concept in regard to child soldiers, simply because age categories are not universal in defining “childhood,” but are instead

largely influenced by culture. Despite criticisms of universalizing such subjective understandings of childhood, many legal bodies continue to try and institutionalize the concept (Rosen, 2007). This concept of childhood also connects to the perception of children as a vulnerable group in need of special protection, as addressed in the theory chapter. Special documents like the Convention on the Rights of the Child embody this quantifiable age of children and their psychosocial needs that must be protected so they can develop properly (Bryant, 2009), which motivates many of the calls for child soldiering to end as it threatens the overall security of children (Achvarina & Reich, 2006; Tripp et al., 2013).

There are several legal protections that exist to ensure children are protected from hostile situations including: the Four Geneva Conventions (1949), the Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (1977), the Convention of the Rights of the Child (1989), local agreements (e.g., The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 1990), the Convention 182 of the International Labour Organization concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (1999), and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (2000) (Druba, 2002).

These different documents reinforce the international community's recognition of threats against children in a variety of forms. Child soldiers are some of the most vulnerable groups of children as they face insecurities in nearly every aspect of their lives. These insecurities stem from both narrow and broad human security lenses, and include insecurities of: mental and emotional development, economic poverty, physical

violence against their person, and no political protection from endogenous and external forces (Faulkner, 2001; Francis, 2007).

In their pernicious roles as soldiers, these children are deprived of any security and peace of mind that would contribute to healthy mental and emotional development, thus impairing neural connections meant to fortify and mature higher-order skills such as: rational decision-making, choosing between good and bad, or controlling urges based upon expected social norms (Bornstein, 2013; The National Scientific Council on the Developing Child, 2014; Somasundaram, 2002). When their personal security is threatened and they cannot be protected by adults, these surviving children find themselves socialized into a cycle of violence that desensitizes them to constituted authority and the sanctity of life when they attempt to return to the community at large (Faulkner, 2001; Francis, 2007).

Recognizing that there are neurological and biological stages of human development, many humanitarian and human rights organizations have urgently petitioned for stricter laws to protect children and prevent their recruitment as soldiers. Groups like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the International Save the Children Alliance, the Quaker United Nations Office, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), along with the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, have advocated the “Straight-18” position, which sets a universal age limit of eighteen years to recruiting children in armed forces, while also barring children from prosecution of war crimes (UNICEF, 2003).

Effectiveness of Legal Protections

As these international legal instruments progressed, they continued to criminalize the use of child soldiers and labeled “child” as anyone under the age of 18 (Becker, 2005; Francis, 2007). The 1977 Protocols Additional established 15 as the minimum age to all children soldier’s “voluntary enrollment” into armed forces, but even later efforts found it impossible to pass resolutions with strict universal definitions of childhood and age restrictions (Rosen, 2007). While there has been mixed success in passing legal resolutions, it is a significant indicator of the influence that human security has made on issues regarding children and threats faced by individuals, something state-centric security would not focus on explicitly.

However, despite the international community’s legal protections and awareness of the varying dangers war presents to children, the prevalent issue of child soldiers has not greatly diminished. Even though the vast majority of governments around the world have signed on to these protocols, they are hesitant to act upon them. Many states sign documents like these for strategic use, to gain rapport with other states for humanitarian or human rights issues, and often they selectively implement portions of the laws (Francis, 2007). Overlapping with the concept of security is the criticism of the UN and its human rights treaties, as some scholars find that signing documents often does little to alter behavior (Hill Jr., 2010; Keith, 1999). In addition, many war-torn states have not ratified these documents, as some do not have the institutional capacity to incorporate them into domestic law or their cultural norms clash too strongly with Western-based definitions of childhood and age limits (Englehart, 2009). Other times political leaders

are simply unwilling to sacrifice the war-fighting benefits of using children in armed conflicts (Francis, 2007).

It is nearly impossible to report accurate numbers in regard to child soldiers, but global estimates believe there are currently some 300,000 child soldiers from over 30 countries, not including the thousands of children already lost in combat. In areas where it is common to employ child soldiers, gathering data is difficult, and few recruiters care to document the children's ages if the children are even willing to provide personal information (Bower, 2008; Faulkner, 2001; Pendersen & Sommerfelt, 2007; Wessells, 2005). Of these estimated 300,000 child soldiers, about 40% are in Africa with recent trends rising. From the global estimate, the Save the Children organization believes around 40% are female child soldiers (Conradi, 2013; Francis, 2007). In fairly recent civil conflicts most child soldiers range from the ages of eight to seventeen, but there are frequently outliers younger than that (Kim, 2006), and in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Colombia and many other rebel and government armies, children comprise over half of the soldiers (Wessells, 2005).

Human Security and Child Soldiers

Human security focuses on the threats that individuals face in their daily lives. It targets seven categories specifically, which are: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. While human security is intentionally broad, as its drafters intended for it to be all encompassing, its vagueness still identifies two distinct aspects (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). The ultimate goal is to promote sustainable development for current and future

generations, so that development leads to human security rooted in freedoms from “fear” and “want” (UNDP, 1994).

The previous chapter discussed the different camps within human security, namely those stemming from the “broad versus narrow” debates, and the subsequent “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” approaches. Freedom from fear directly relates to violent threats that jeopardize the physical integrity of individuals, so the human security response to these kinds of threats strives to protect individuals from such violence. Securing their physical safety is a key component to the narrow approach of human security (Jutersonke & Schwarz, 2005; Zambelli, 2002).

There are a number of factors that influence the process that culminates in children joining the ranks of armies, both forcibly and voluntarily. Many children are violently thrust into an unwanted army life, and are abducted or kidnapped en masse as army leaders sweep through villages and terrorize children into joining, often after they have been forced to kill family members (Betancourt et al., 2008; Faulkner 2001). Some studies have shown that most children are not actually “forced” directly into joining, but are rather influenced by “push” and “pull” factors that motivate them to join. A study on four central African countries indicated that some two-thirds of children interviewed by NGOs collecting data identified themselves as “volunteers.” (Francis, 2007). Since so many children seem to join of their own volition, it is important to explore these factors and how they deprive children of human security.

“Push” factors and human security. Some children willingly join, but only because they realize their recruitment is inevitable, and by joining early they decrease their risk of being abducted or killed during a raid (Betancourt et al., 2008). While

survival is a major motivation across the board, “push” factors are typically rooted in the need for food, security, health care, desire to escape forced marriages (for young girls), or from having family killed or separated (Betancourt et al., 2008; Francis, 2007; Skinner, 1999; Somasundaram, 2002; Wessells 2005; Zack-Williams, 2001). These “push” factors that motivate children to become soldiers largely fall under the umbrella of human security, or the lack of it.

In the context of child soldiers, the obvious abuse of their physical integrity through their forced conscription is shown in the definition of the narrow “freedom from fear” approach to human security. Regardless of which fighting faction takes these children into their ranks, the government has clearly failed to ensure their physical safety, and in doing so has rendered them totally vulnerable to all insecurities that might ensue from a militarized existence; which overlaps with nearly each of the seven categories human security explicitly addresses. Their human security is also legally violated as the very use of child soldiers is prohibited by international laws, like the Protocols Additional I and II and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Francis, 2007). When states are too weak to protect their citizens, political insecurity is rampant, and the state’s lack of security becomes a burden and a threat to the individual (Englehart, 2009).

While they are primarily facing tangible threats, in the form of menacing armies and rebel groups, they are also suffering from lack of security in the wider “freedom from want” approach. As the “push” factors that bring child soldiers to the armed forces explain, it is usually unmet needs in the form of poverty and hunger, working in tandem with other social forces, that render them extremely vulnerable to the direct violation of their physical security (Skinner, 1999). In addition to state and physical insecurity, child

soldiers also face abuse primarily because of the insecurity of their vulnerable nature as inexperienced minors lacking adult support and protection (Schenk et al., 2010).

Vulnerability and insecurity. Unfortunately, children are a highly sought after commodity in war zones. Both rebel and government armies in countries around the world³ readily exploit children as soldiers, and value them for their easily manipulatable naiveté. This naiveté is part of what makes them vulnerable in general, but also particularly easy prey for adults eager to use them. Once in the army, children are further socialized into violence among other deleterious habits. There are reports of adults injecting the children with cocaine and giving them other drugs, in the attempt “to harden their hearts and minds” before killing, as one young boy from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone told interviewers (Betancourt et al., 2008). As far as socializing children into violence, the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda forced children to kill family members or other villagers when they were abducted, totally eradicating their home and any chance for them to return to a place to rebuild their future (Wessells, 2005). Children are seen as the “ideal soldier” because they are dispensable, since they are cheap, abundant, and have virtually no family responsibilities that might inhibit their fortitude (Zack-Williams, 2001). Commanders prefer them because children are more easily terrorized, and thus are easy to manipulate. Compared to adult soldiers, they are extremely obedient, rarely question orders, and eagerly volunteer for dangerous assignments because they do not fully know their own mortality (Wessells, 2005).

¹ According Human Rights Watch the following countries actively recruit and use child soldiers: Afghanistan, Burma, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, India, Iraq, Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, and Yemen.

While these patterns for recruitment are echoed through much of the child soldier literature, sweeping generalizations of the global nature of child soldiering is dangerous. Social, political, and cultural dynamics and even the duration of conflict make the experience somewhat different for each child. Much of the media and scholarly circles tend to focus on the archetypical African child soldier, yet other countries like Afghanistan, Colombia, and Sri Lanka employ their use as well. Perhaps this is due to the predisposed disposition of Westerners to view Africa in need of special attention in regards to humanitarian aid, or simply because they have the highest percentage of child soldiers globally (Mackey, 2013; Moynagh, 2011). Despite the fact that personal experiences vary based on location, gender, and length of conflict child soldiers around the world do share similar “push” and “pull” factors that bring them to armies or rebel forces. While some reports of child soldiers in El Salvador claimed they were never forced to take drugs (Dickson-Gomez, 2002), children in Sierra Leone and Liberia gave testimony to the narcotics and hallucinogens they were made to take before battle (Betancourt et al., 2008). In addition to similar overarching influences, psychological and emotional damage is an inner war that continues to be fought well after the children have grown up or have left warzones (Dickson-Gomez, 2002).

Psychological traumatization and insecurity. While some literature finds comfort in the fact that children are more resilient to life’s more traumatic experiences, simply because of their lack of understanding, scientific evidence points to mental development stages that need peaceful and secure environments to properly form. Children are considered vulnerable because they are developing into adulthood, and need guidance and protection during that process; but child soldiers are made insecure in this part of

their lives as well. Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) and “Toxic Stress,” (which would be witnessing brutality and/or participating in warfare for child soldiers) affect developing children mentally, emotionally, and sometimes physically in their key formative years (Bornstein, 2013). During these crucially impressionable years, children can suffer from severely damaging effects from prolonged stress in circumstances where there is not adequate protection from adults (UNICEF, 2009).

This protection from adults begins with the relationship between mothers and infants, which establishes the “basic trust” bond as she cares for all the baby’s needs. As children grow, especially between the ages of five and seven, the parents and close relations teach the child whom to trust outside its family before he or she has fully developed an autonomous identity capable of rationalizing (Dickson-Gomez, 2002). As the brain develops, stability and emotional wellbeing are necessary to build a strong foundation for emerging cognitive abilities, which become the brain’s architecture (Bremner, 2006).

In warzones, either as a refugee witnessing traumatic brutality against family members or a child soldier more extremely exposed to and/or engaged in physical violence, the child’s conception of normal social structures and trust among different relations is severely damaged. Witnessing this abuse totally destroys the “basic trust” that a protective and stable environment would prepare a young child to build upon for the rest of his or her life, and the tumultuous nature of war severely impedes the development of the child becoming a stable adult (Boothby & Knudson, 2000; Dickson-Gomez, 2002).

Similar to how PTSD affects the brain, children in prolonged tumultuous circumstances develop as the brain is forced to function while releasing high levels of

stress-induced hormones like cortisol. The consistent presence of these adrenaline hormones prevent the frontal lobe from developing the skills to differentiate among conflicting thoughts and stunts their ability to make logical decisions, which can lead to violent and abusive behavior against themselves or others even in peaceful settings (Boothby & Knudson, 2000; Bremner, 2006). The environment in which the child develops often has links to the development of the state, which in turn typically affects the human development and “freedom from want” in the individual’s life (Ferreira, 2008).

Development and Child Soldiers

While development has typically been measured according to an economic standard as explained in the previous chapter, human security has stemmed out of critiques that widen and deepen the scope of defining and evaluating human development (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). Despite the broader understanding of what development is, which can include quality and quantity of life and even political freedoms (King & Murray, 2001); economic development is still a cornerstone of the debate (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998). When resources and benefits are unevenly distributed in societies that lack proper political avenues for debate or expression, not only is conflict more likely; but human security is also jeopardized in several ways (Duffield, 2014).

In contrast to narrow approaches to human security, the broader concept of freedom from want extends the criteria of “threats” to concepts like hunger, pollution, and diseases like HIV/AIDS. Further, this vision of human security adopts the goal to ensure the general wellbeing of humanity. It is often linked with the idea of development, which subsequently prioritizes social and economic freedoms as well as opportunities to

exercise choice in one's daily life (Zambelli, 2002). As previous sections have addressed, child soldiers who were interviewed explained that had there been viable alternative choices to joining an army they would have taken them (Betancourt et al., 2008). This points directly to the lack of institutional, economic, and social development which hinders individual's ability to choose between options that will allow them safety and provision.

“Pull” factors and development. “Pull” factors are usually surrounded by a desire for revenge for family or friends killed by the opposing belligerent group; desire to join older brothers, uncles, or fathers already serving; money; or sometimes the indoctrination of a patriotic altruism to save fellow victims. In reality, whether or not the children joined “voluntarily” is an insignificant question, as there is truly no alternative to recruitment in these poverty-stricken war zones (Betancourt et al., 2008; Francis, 2007; Skinner, 1999; Somasundaram, 2002; Wessells, 2005; Zack-Williams, 2001). These underdeveloped states have a severe lack of free education, employment, and social opportunities for youth, and often children join to feel empowered or to find some sort of purpose. Many children interviewed in rehabilitation centers express that had there been alternatives to fighting they would have taken them (Francis, 2007).

While some factors “push” and “pull” children into soldiering for personal reasons, scholars also point to other widespread aspects like poverty, high orphan rates, and the proliferation of small weapons as direct correlations to the recruitment of child soldiers by both the government and rebel forces (Skinner, 1999). According to some scholars, there is a robust correlation between child soldier recruiting and the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps that these children flock to for “safety” and food, largely due to

their apparent total lack of protection. Since these camps are vulnerable to attack and their porous fences easily allow armed intruders inside, many children⁴ are swayed into joining through propoganda or are simply abducted. There is no better way for belligerent mobs to forcibly recruit child soldiers than within an undefended camp already full of children. They often steal the food that was meant for the camps, and promise children regular meals, clothes, and some sense of belonging (Achvarina & Reich 2006; Faulkner, 2001).

High orphan rates across the African continent are an example of human insecurities resulting from underdevelopment. Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC) are defined by their abject poverty, lack of support, care, and protection. They are more vulnerable than other children in their community, as they are less likely to afford to attend school or even basic nutrition (Bryant, 2009). Since health issues like HIV/AIDS are major contributors to augmenting the OVC population, the severe lack of health physicians, access to medical care, and safe sex education is especially evident (Schenk et al., 2010). Their absence points to structural inadequacies that cannot provide such services, and as a result insufficiently work to quell existing insecurities concerning health and poverty.

Poverty and development. Some scholars feel that a focus on the physical and mental trauma of child soldiers distracts a closer look at structural problems of poverty and lack of education and employment opportunities (Korbin, 2003). Economic underdevelopment of the state creates insecurities on multiple levels. When child soldiers

² There are no specific numbers that represent the percentage of children abducted from IDP camps, but UNICEF and Save the Children officials report that recruitment is widespread. Children in these camps already risk human rights violations, so it is not unlikely that they risk recruitment (Achvarina & Reich, 2006).

were interviewed about motivations to join in warfare, many stressed their frustration concerning the lack of educational opportunities, economic failure, social problems, and political corruption, which resulted because of civil conflict. Some child soldiers even said they would flee to demobilization camps as a way out of fighting, but upon discovering how little opportunities existed for a viable livelihood rejoined the army (Skinner, 1999). Poverty makes people vulnerable because their human security and development is confined to however few options the state offers.

Underdevelopment and poverty have been labeled as major contributing factors to conflict, as they make political stability difficult to establish and maintain. If economic development is not spread evenly enough across multiple sectors of society, it will inevitably favor a smaller portion of the population for its rewards and resources (Brown, 1971). When these different variables come together, it is not unlikely that violence foments and eventually erupts in some sort of internal conflict. This motivation to fight because of a lack of economic development and widespread poverty is a central tenet to the “greed versus grievance” debate introduced in the theory chapter. While Collier and Hoeffler argue that greed is nearly always the dominant factor in instigating conflict (1998), motivations for child soldiers to join the fight stem from “push” and “pull” factors that exist because of threats to their security as well as personal vendettas, or grievances, against harm done to their families or communities (Wessells, 2005).

Security and Development in Tandem

As the example of child soldiers has shown, the human security of the individual is tied to the security of their environment, and when a civil war further destabilizes an already weak government there is little or no protection of the general populace (Ferreira,

2008; Murshed, 2002), particularly for vulnerable groups like children. Understanding how human security's broad definition encompasses not only personal freedoms but also economic security, development is an integral part to sustaining a community and fostering peaceful methods of debate and change (Sobek, 2010; Starr, 2006)

Where there is development both economically and politically, human security has a greater chance to flourish in both broad and narrow aspects. Yet, in places where child soldiers are employed, regardless of culture's perceptions of Western "childhood" constructs, these states tend to lack strong political leadership and sustainable industry (Starr, 2006). While the overarching doctrine of human security reaches past state borders and extends the rights of security to all individuals, its lack of presence is evident as child soldiers are robbed of both freedoms from "fear" and "want." The "push" and "pull" factors that motivate children to join armies particularly show that economic security, food security, personal security, community security, and political security are the most directly affected realms of human security that fail to flourish for its citizens' benefit and wellbeing.

Particularly considering the legal protections over children, the presence of child soldiers should warrant intervention from the international community, yet this often does not happen (Druba, 2002; Francis, 2007). Documents like R2P⁵ shift discourse from the "right to intervene" to the "responsibility to protect," and yet so many humanitarian crises that clearly deny individuals security proceed to the brink of total disaster before anyone steps in to do something (Jutersonke & Schwarz, 2005). While outright conflict is usually part of the theoretical yardstick used to measure the intensity of "thresholds" of abuse

³ While R2P is more directly linked to human rights, the concepts still overlap with human security concerns as well.

before intervention is warranted (ICISS, 2001), underdeveloped economies and weak governing structures should proactively be treated so as to reverse the destructive trends that culminate in depriving people of both freedoms from “want” and “fear.”

A Case Study: Sierra Leone’s Civil War

The former British colony and protectorate of Sierra Leone sits on the West coast of Africa, and is rich in minerals and diamonds. Coupled with a historically corrupt government and the infamous “resource curse,” exploitative tendencies by local and global markets have supported the illicit economy, and allowed conflict to thrive (BBC, 2014). The “Dutch disease” or “resource curse” is a theory that attempts to explain why some resource rich states fail to thrive and develop compared to successful states that are likewise rich or not rich in natural resources. Some scholars have found that weak governing institutions that are unable to provide security in these resource rich states are responsible for the violent conflict, looting, and financing of rebel groups that results (Skaperdas, 2002). In the example of Sierra Leone, the abundance of easily lootable alluvial minerals (i.e., diamonds, gold, platinum) combined with corrupt and weak government hindered proper economic investment and growth within its political borders, and further stressed the inequalities between poor citizens and those wealthy leaders who benefited from such illicit activities (Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 2006; van der Ploeg, 2011).

While the British still ruled Sierra Leone, they set up colonial rule in the capital, Freetown, but allowed local leadership to control the remaining territory. Sierra Leone’s historic chieftaincies that developed under British arrangement became lifetime and inheritable positions, and augmented in power as they controlled economic development

and socio-political events over the population. These positions became lucrative titles, which constantly abetted violent competition among ruling families. These disputes were interminably fueled by discontent rural populations exhausted by abusive ruling practices including excessive taxes, land allocation, and severe punishment for protestations (Jang, 2012).

Despite the country's new status as a republic in 1961, President Siaka Stevens ensured that patrimonial ties were reinforced, as he offered spoils from illegal diamond trading to key leaders and military figures to ensure loyalty, which depleted government funds while leaving the majority of army soldiers unpaid. He ensured that the army did not receive adequate training or materials, hoping that a weak army would not threaten to overthrow his regime; but employed them to suppress the citizens and any opponents to his regime (Jang, 2012; Keen, 2003; Koroma, 2012; TRC, 2004).

When Joseph Momoh undemocratically succeeded Stevens as president, the government was practically bankrupt, often leaving civil servants unpaid due to lack of funds. Momoh tried to restore democratic governance, but the outbreak of war and a military coup in 1992 prevented that (Koroma, 2012). Momoh instituted strict austerity plans in an attempt to meet the IMF and World Bank standards to obtain a loan, which moved away from the historic patrimonial system of benefits. While most of the state was already experiencing lack of social services, this further culminated in severe cuts to health and educational programs affecting both the urban and rural populations (Gale, 2004). With the fall of the Soviet Union, Sierra Leone lost funding from its patron, which had allowed Sierra Leone's government to depend on external financial sponsorship, diminishing the urgent need for the new country to develop its own source of internal

revenue and an efficient way of collecting state income. Instead, the infrastructure of the state was weakened, and the paranoid and excessive nature of patrimonial governance faced internal strife as their support withered away with the end of the Soviet Union. This failure of the corrupt patrimonial system only exacerbated those at the lowest rung of society, the youth (Hoffman, 2006).

With ordinary people's total lack of access to resources and rising costs of education, the patrimonial system fell apart and fueled the fire for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to gain support, especially among the recently unemployed and the youth who were no longer able to attend school (Gale, 2004; Jang, 2012). Jobless youth were immensely frustrated, and since few opportunities existed outside of the illicit trade of resources, many educational dropouts found themselves turning to the RUF in solidarity against the grievances that they felt towards their own government (Hoffman, 2006; Reno, 1998; Skinner, 1999). While it may certainly be argued that greed was also a motivating factor for the civil war, only those leaders willing to use the most violent means directly profited, while the majority of the population that supported their actions did so because the cost of non-participation and not choosing to side with either force endangered their security even more (Justino, 2009).

The RUF movement received training, funding, and support in Liberia from its rebel leader, Charles Taylor, whose own personal vendetta against the Momoh government partly inspired his aid. The RUF was headed by infamous ex-army corporal Foday Sankoh, and was comprised of Sierra Leoneans living in Liberia, mercenaries from the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), and those who had experienced combat training in Libya. In 1991, the 11-year civil war began when the RUF attacked and

captured towns bordering Liberia in the diamond-rich eastern territories, culminating in the killing of thousands of innocent civilians. The civil war lasted from 1991 until January of 2002, and with help from the international community Sierra Leone has initiated war crimes courts, truth and reconciliation commissions, and disarmament and rehabilitations programs. Over 50,000 people were killed in the war, with thousands of children left as orphans, and over an estimated 6,800 to 10,000 children under the age of 14 forcibly recruited to fight in both rebel and government forces (Achvarina & Reich, 2006; Murphy, 2003; Reuters, 2007; UNICEF, 2002).

Patrimonial Government and Its Abuses

The history of Sierra Leone's efforts to decolonize, as well as colonial and local elite's support for its lineage of corrupt leaders, are important to frame the context of the infamous civil war in which child soldiers fought and fell. Sierra Leone is an example of the economic, political, and social insecurities that arise when economic poverty dictates day-to-day life. As the brief overview of Sierra Leone's history indicates, British colonial rule allowed local leaders outside of the capital to rule rural areas through chieftaincies, which gave them opportunities to reestablish indigenous leaders. This patrimonial system that promoted hierarchical loyalties and bequeathed perks to insider circles, continued well after Sierra Leone gained independence as a republic. Since corruption was innate to the formation of the state, it is no surprise that illicit traders swiftly dominated lucrative industries, especially the easily lootable diamond mines. The diamond economy, once monopolized by the British De Beers Company, was thwarted by smugglers who initially helped establish the illicit diamond pipeline to Liberia, effectively robbing the Sierra Leonean market of its major export. These smugglers were encouraged to continue their

actions by President Stevens, who directly profited from the underhanded trade, creating an unstable and dwindling economic sector for the population. When the war did break out, both armies used illegally obtained diamonds to trade for goods and weapons, often recruiting more children to help dig the diamonds (Johnson, 2002; Koroma, 2012; Skinner, 1999).

This overarching patrimonial government extends into sociopolitical structures of Sierra Leone, especially when dealing with its youth populations. Murphy (2003) introduces the concept of patrimonialism and its failures in African states. Max Weber (1946) defines patrimonialism as an extension of patriarchy's personal loyalties, but differs as its domain encapsulates a wider territory and resource control, which requires a bureaucracy of sorts to manage its many subdomains. This patrimonial system, as seen in Sierra Leone before the civil war, was marked by redistributing resources as marks of personal favor, which were earned by loyalty to the leader, instead of loyalty to the institution. The state elites become the patron and the citizens the client, but this network of distributing favors and resources is inherently limited and ultimately unsustainable (Murphy, 2003). Since leaders use this patrimonial system to gain support to benefit themselves and their small entourage, the resources and finances they amass line their own pockets instead of supporting economic development in the state (Luke, 1988). This ultimately undermines the entire state and its legitimacy as force to deliver public goods, as it cannot fund education or employment opportunities for its people, rendering them vulnerable and insecure (Rotberg, 2002). This is a particularly dangerous threat to security for young people, as they are the most inclined to join revolutionary groups due

to feeling animosity against their government's lack of provision for them (Poku et al., 2007; Starr, 2006)

Murphy clarifies that patrimonialism today is not always straightforward, and in the case of Sierra Leone a “shadow government,” was masked by an official and elected governmental administration and a liberal ideology imparted by the British colonizers. This “shadow government” continued the practices of personal favors as it controlled informal markets and illicit economic operations, like the diamond smuggling into Liberia, and later used any profit to control loyal beneficiaries throughout the country. Eventually the civil war brought this to an end, and because of the instability of the illicit diamond trade, patrimonialism in government proved unsuccessful, as it could no longer manage its many warlords or provide stability for its territory (Murphy, 2003).

In this vein of patrimonialism, the patron-client relationship was especially strong between the upper military elites and child soldiers. Steven's so-called “big men” military leaders, who had control of subdomains in Sierra Leone, used their own benefits to build a following of supporters, a microcosm of the state patrimonial system. Child soldiers played a variety of roles in their service to these military leaders before and during the war, as they helped punish disloyal citizens and extracted resources from travelers at checkpoints. As mentioned by several authors, child soldiers are favored because they are easy to manipulate and show great fidelity to their leaders; and this is particularly evident in the patrimonial environment where a once poor and abandoned child can earn his or her food, shelter, and power under this new fatherly-esque patron (Murphy, 2003).

These “push” and “pull” factors that entice or force children to join army ranks come in a variety of motivations. While it is true that some children volunteer to join these armies, it begs the question if this choice to join is in reality a false dichotomy. As mentioned in previous sections, how much of a choice do children really have if survival is the main factor for a final decision (Betancourt et al., 2008; Francis, 2007; Skinner, 1999; Somasundaram, 2002; Wessells, 2005; Zack-Williams, 2001)? Overlapping with human security concerns, these “push” and “pull” motivations reflect the lack of safety and development that would even offer alternatives like education or jobs, instead of a violent life as a soldier.

As the patrimonial “shadow government” proved to be corrupt and ineffective in providing stable economic sectors for its population, unequal distributions of wealth and resources were commonplace. This war found its catalyst in the diamond smuggling business, but the conditions needed to create the opportunity for such conflict came from a history of a weak national economy and structural adjustment plans made to attract foreign investors and loans (Hick, 2001). While not all poor states experience internal conflict (Sobek, 2010), Sierra Leone’s abject poverty together with underdeveloped markets and its history of corrupt governance created a vacuum for stability and order. Once chaos broke out, these same factors fueled the fires of conflict. When RUF soldiers recruited children to enlist, either at the end of a gun or in less belligerent terms, (aside from the motivation for immediate survival) children often saw a chance to have power and status that was nonexistent in their despondent poverty (Skinner, 1999).

Rehabilitation Efforts and Structural Shortcomings

While child soldiers everywhere certainly struggle to cope with the traumatic experiences they have come to accept as normal or even empowering, the remaining civilian community faces an entirely different obstacle in allowing these seasoned killers back into their homes (Faulkner, 2001). Part of the allure to the army is the familial type bonds that are formed, along with provision for food, security, and a sense of belonging and purpose (Skinner, 1999). When the war ended and children (or those who had grown into adulthood during the war) returned, many found no family or at most broken remnants that were in many ways unprepared to help them transition into peacetime lifestyles. These children were both victims and victimizers, and this conflicting state of being abused and in turn abusing others further complicates their position in society. Many of these ex-combatants are overlooked, abandoned, and largely viewed as a lost generation. Traditionally, children are seen as lamentable “collateral damage” during regular wartime, but the truth of manipulated, yet brutal, child soldiers disturbs this image and complicates our own perceptions of the capacity and agency of children (Francis, 2007; Monforte, 2007). Human security recognizes the abuse these children have endured, and their total lack of “freedom from fear,” which would spare them from physical violence and provide safety. Reintegrating them into a society that is willing and able to accept them is a huge part of restoring an environment that fosters safety and security for them.

Since the end of the war, a national effort supported by UNICEF and international nongovernmental organizations have stepped into Sierra Leone and initiated rehabilitation programs of varying sorts to reconnect local communities with their

children. These short-term initiatives are typically called disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs, and seek to organize the process to reintroduce them into society. DDR programs aim to individually rehabilitate and heal the invisible scars these children carry, but also seek to incorporate four major elements along the way. These rehabilitation programs try to trace family and reunite them with the children, provide psychological support as they come to terms with war experiences, provide vocational training for life skills and future trades, and provide basic education and literacy for the children (Betancourt et al., 2008; Faulkner, 2001; Wessells, 2005). These DDR programs led by NGOs and other organizations are rooted in the same foundations of human security, and its wider lens to provide human development and economic opportunities for individuals. These programs strive to connect children with family and teach them employable skill sets, all of which will assist these children in making new lives during peacetime.

While these DDR centers aim to fully rehabilitate children, they fall short in several ways, particularly when it comes to the girls. Their purpose is to help children reintegrate into society, but when this fails to reach the vast majority of children in need those left unassisted are made insecure in new ways. As earlier estimates showed, girl soldiers have grown in number and are expected to serve alongside the boys as combatants or human shields, but mostly serve in domesticated roles as guards, porters, cooks, and are frequently subjected to rape or sexual exploitation. Girls have also proven to be among the group's most valued assets for their unassuming persona, which makes them excellent spies, or reconnaissance officers, as well as caregivers to the younger children (Conradi, 2013).

Historically, women are viewed as purveyors of peace, but as girls' participation in armed conflict shows, this assumption is false. Recruitment for women also has a positive linear relationship to the casualties of men and boys, and when those figures are high girls are more likely to be abducted for service (Becker, 2005; Francis, 2007). While many are abducted, there are accounts of women eagerly joining the ranks of soldiers, as many saw it as an opportunity to gain independence, leadership positions, and power (Wessells, 2005; Zack-Williams, 2001). Unfortunately, many of the DDR programs lack adequate resources and funding to properly treat more than 10% of the children affected by war, and girls are disproportionately denied access to these programs and the benefits that they offer (Kim, 2006). This unfortunate fact is a reflection of deep-seated cultural gender roles, and further indicates the lack of human security and human development particular to girls. Girls must endure the norms of inferiority imposed by patriarchal structures, as they are typically less likely to attend and finish school, more likely to be married at younger ages than their male counterparts, and less likely than boys to have a comprehensive knowledge of HIV/AIDS and means to protect themselves (UNICEF, 2014). Their personal and political security is directly threatened, as they are often kept from these DDR camps by force or by social pressure that makes them unwelcome in their old communities.

This is not entirely the fault of the programs, as many girls are never allowed to leave the RUF camp, since many military commanders claim them as “wives” or allow them to depart unnoticed, thus the girls are not officially registered for the rehabilitation programs. Often these girls become pregnant by RUF officers and contract HIV/AIDS or other diseases, which not only make them unfit for marriage but permanently affixes the

stigma of the enemy upon them, making it even harder to reintegrate into their own communities (Dupuy, 2011; Kim, 2006; Pendersen & Sommerfelt, 2007). In addition, many NGOs that would provide subsidized educational opportunities through the Sierra Leonean government require that children go through such DDR programs in order to receive stipends to go to school, which discriminates against former girl soldiers who were unable to participate. These girls were unable to receive the psychological counseling, medical care, help in relocating family, as well as training and education through these initiatives, which only perpetuates the existing structural problems (Betancourt et al., 2008).

Conclusion

While poverty is not the only factor that leads to insecure environments that foster child soldiers, though nearly all former child soldiers claimed that their poverty was a motivation for their recruitment, it is noteworthy that economic underdevelopment and weak governing institutions are common variables in these situations (Achvarina & Reich, 2006). In war zones, despondent circumstances of poverty are further exacerbated, and often rebel forces exploit the already vulnerable populations, like stealing food meant for IDP and refugee camps to use as leverage for recruiting children. Such prolific problems like poverty, high orphan populations, the proliferation of light-weight and cheap weapons, and collapsed infrastructures and economies of states are towering long-term issues that cannot be solved quickly. In fact, these structural problems perpetuated by patrimonial government and the inequitable distribution of wealth and resources, motivated the RUF and its child soldiers to embrace an “intergenerational struggle for a fairer society,” as one child soldier explained (Skinner, 1999, p. 14).

There is a need for prevention-based solutions, and a responsibility for the international community to promote human security and respect for all individuals, which will inevitably secure the state as well. Widening the scope of non-traditional security to encompass socio-economic development is vital to help rebuild war torn states like Sierra Leone, and engender new concepts of individual value and hope (Achvarina & Reich, 2006; Zach-Williams, 2001). While short-term plans to actually protect IDP and refugee camps and ensure they receive food, is a logical and necessary solution for one aspect of the issue, it does not address structural problems that point to underdevelopment. Equitable development, fair trade, and corporations and governments that are held accountable for their actions are among some of the necessary changes that will protect not only children from conflict, but help restore countries and prevent future wars (Hick, 2001). Ideally, children would never be involved so directly in the atrocities of war, but once war has begun its abuses can only be mitigated. Only by breaking the cycle of violence can these child soldiers and the next generation be free to build a society apart from such brutality, and much of this begins with security rooted in physical safety and the opportunities afforded by economic development (Francis, 2007; Hick, 2001).

Chapter 4: The Street and Its Children

This chapter explores the phenomenon of street children and how their human security is affected by underdevelopment. Neoliberal economic policies have helped shape development around the world, and their influence on marginalized populations is an important story to tell. Who are these street children, and how did they come to live this way? This chapter uses the popular case study of Brazil, as its history is replete with controversy over the presence and abuse of street children.

Introduction

According to UNICEF, there are over 100 million street children worldwide, though these estimates are never certain because of defining qualitative requirements that may exclude certain children (UNICEF, 2005). There are varying degrees to which children are engaged with street life, which creates confusion when differentiating between groups who fall under the umbrella term of “street child.” The UNICEF definition of children “on” the street describes those who work in the street, but maintain ties with family networks back home. Children “of” the street describe children who live, work, and sleep in the street (Aptekar & Heinonen, 2003; Landers 1988). Throughout the world these children are the most deprived people, typically with little to no access to health care, and often facing abuse of some sort before they even find their way to street life. Despite many legal protections or international documents like the Convention on the Rights of the Child, many children are left to suffer human security abuses in the form of violence and discrimination, and in areas where street child populations run high they are seen as a nuisance and a not collective problem to be solved (Scanlon, Tomkins, Lynch, & Scalon, 1998).

General Discussion of Street Children

In defining the context and structural perimeters of street children, it is important to explore what common factors push them to street life. As noted above, there is a difference between children who work in the street and return home to sleep, versus children who primarily exist and sleep in the street. One of the core misconceptions of street children is that they are all orphans or wholly abandoned, and this simply is not true (Schwinger, 2007). Many of the children are considered “child street laborers,” which are defined as children younger than eighteen years of age that work full-time in a variety of occupations in the street. In contrast, children who work *and* live in the street are more likely to have been estranged from their families, perhaps due to death, neglect, abuse, or insufficient emotional and financial resources (Offit, 2008). Regardless if the children have a home to return to in the city or three hours away in a rural village, the same desperate need to make money propels them towards the “*essa vida*,” or “street life” as Brazilian children termed it (Hecht, 1998). Despite its dangers, many see the street as a vibrant place full of opportunity and potential, especially for a young child eager to make their own way (Landers 1988; Offit, 2008).

Children “on” the Street

Surrounding the child “on” the street, usually employed as a laborer, is a cultural and moral motivation to work hard. In cases of extreme poverty, parents often do not have the luxury of fulfilling a common dream to send their children to school. Even though many countries offer “free” education, the yearly cost of supplementary materials, uniforms, or transportation can add up to a month’s wages, and suddenly becomes unattainable if there are several children in a family. Especially for many rural families in

Latin American countries, it is typical for the older children to leave the family farms and work in the city to send money back home (Ennew & Swart-Kruger, 2003; Landers, 1988; Offit 2008).

One researcher in Guatemala interviewed poor Mayan street children and their parents about working so young. They all posited a strong work ethic as a means to avoid criminal lives, especially those of thievery. In fact, when children in Guatemala were asked what they would do if they returned home without any money, they could not fathom the concept of returning to their families empty-handed or of withholding a large portion of the money they earned. The idea of working for an individual instead of the family unit is a foreign concept to most of them. Sending a child at the age of seven or eight to a city three hours away is not ideal, but it is an accepted fact of life for many families, as many have extended networks of kin that will likely house their children. Contrary to the notion that all children in the street are abandoned, most street laborers keep strong cultural and familial ties to their local villages and often return at least monthly with money, or for religious celebrations, to help with harvests, and eventually to marry (Offit, 2008).

Children “of” the Street

In the case of street children, family ties are not as distinguishable as those of the child street laborers, but only a small percentage claim to never return home (Hecht, 1998). In fact, family relationships are very important in defining “street life” and “home,” and the major distinction between sleeping in the street and calling a place home is in relation to where the child’s mother is. There are usually complicated family dynamics for these children, in which fathers are largely absent, or mothers remarry and

step-fathers often abuse, neglect, or outright refuse to keep the children under their roofs (Hecht, 1998; Motala & Smith, 2003). While it is true that the vast majority of children stay with their parents regardless of extreme poverty, those that flee usually speak of the need to help care for the family unit, but also talk of the allure of the street. Street children from Recife and Olinda, Brazil explained in interviews that the street provided freedom from adults and any responsibility. The mantra common to them, “chiefs are for Indians,” explains their shared desire for autonomy, and in the street away from family and school, this is their reality (Hecht, 1998).

Projecting an Image

While most continents are faced with rising levels of street child populations, it is highest in Latin America. Some scholarly accounts note the link between poor states and rapid urbanization as a link to rising street child populations. Two hundred years ago, as England, France, and the United States were industrializing, there were reports of large numbers of seemingly abandoned children living in the major cities. Similarly, after the World Wars, and general rural-to-urban migrations over the years, these same states have seen rising numbers in street children. Large cities in Latin America are no exception to this rural-urban migration, and the economic and social repercussions of these mass migrations are far-reaching (Landers, 1988; Scanlon et al., 1998). The rising populations of street child laborers and those who live on the street are a direct result of the poverty that their families have little control over, so children will employ whatever charms and youthfulness they have to survive (Offit, 2008).

Children learn to use their image of helplessness and youth to manipulate adults into buying their goods or giving them money. Depending on the situation, the real-life

vulnerability of these children becomes a tool they employ to elicit pecuniary responses from adults. Offit compares children's tactics of survival to a sort of performance in a particularly poignant paragraph:

Consequently, children are placed in many difficult situations, caught between adults who either condemn or grudgingly accept their participation in the workplace, and the abundance of forces that encourage them to work and make this work profitable. Their limited age, size, and experience make them less competent than adults, yet these same adults are still eager to employ and patronize them. Finally, while all of these adults are willing to concede that it is dire poverty and deprivation that forces these children into the streets to work, few want to hire, patronize, or feel responsible for a child who fully portrays his or her hardship. It is therefore incumbent upon child street laborer to present to adults- their parents, employers, clients, and benefactors- that face and attitude of the child they wish to see (namely, that of a happy, resourceful child with a resilient spirit), which then frees the adult from the onerous burden of being an exploiter of children. The contradictions were fashioned by society, but it is the child who must resolve them....(Offit, 2008, p. 122)

This quote speaks to the complexity of cultural norms surrounding the “deserving poor,” which are those impoverished people who show resolve to work hard despite their unfortunate position, thus making them worthy of assistance (Tripp et al., 2013).

However, children in these positions must perch precariously between projecting the image of the resourceful child “deserving” of help and patronage, and the pitiable urchin who represents the crushing effects of society's inequalities and hierarchy which might burden patrons with feelings of guilt. Typically, those street laborers who make strong efforts to show they are a distinct class above the children “of” the street earn more money and somewhat higher social standing than children who find themselves lumped into a criminal category for mere existence in the street (Salazar, 2008). The attitude of others reflects the social status and image of the particularly vulnerable and marginalized

street child, which is largely pressed upon them by the economic underdevelopment that engenders many of their insecurities.

Projecting this image of hard-working members of society is an important part of understanding the life trajectory goals of the children themselves. Despite the lifestyle of the children who live and/or work in the street, which is closely connected to violence and theft, researchers found that children voiced dreams of hopeful futures, families of their own, and respect from the community. When asked how some children in Rio spent the money they earned the top responses included: drugs, food, clothes, and hotel rooms in which to escape for a short time. These purchasable commodities represent tangible ways for children to assert an identity that is similar to normal citizens and bolster their self-esteem as “being like everyone else” (Rizzini & Butler, 2003).

The interviewed children in Salvador, Brazil mostly saw the street as a temporary phase of their lives, until they could earn enough to ensure a better lifestyle for themselves. When merchants and storekeepers in the same area were interviewed they had mixed emotions concerning the vulnerability of the children and their loss of childhood, but also a fear of early criminality, drugs, violence, and how this behavior would affect their business in negative ways. In stark contrast, these child street laborers (mostly working as car window washers and shoe shiners) saw themselves as productive members of society whose work helped their community and financially benefited their families (Rodwell & Cavalcanti, 1998).

Part of the image of street children is youthfulness. As children grow older adults fear them more. Connecting with the quote above, children know that adults expect certain “performances” of happy and resilient facades, but these pitiable, yet charitable,

glances towards children only last until the child grows into a less adorable and more unfortunate adolescent. Trends among the children find that younger kids around age five to seven earn more money begging or working, while older children are more likely to join violent gangs or engage in crime to earn their living (Epstein, 1996; Rizzini & Butler, 2003; Rodwell & Cavalcanti, 1998; Offit, 2008).

Human Security and Street Children

These vulnerabilities of childhood, in addition to the threats they face as “street children,” encompass narrow and broad aspects of human security including: economic security and extreme poverty, physical violence against their person, lack of protection from the law, and health concerns. Physical insecurity often comes through fear of abuse from either parental figures at home or brutality from people in the street, and directly threatens the human security of these children (Motala & Smith, 2003; Schwinger, 2007). They face daily menaces that rob them of the notion of “freedom from fear,” which is meant to ensure that at the bare minimum individuals are guaranteed protection from physical violence against their person (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). While many of the children voice that the street has allure because of this total freedom from adults, responsibilities, and school, in reality this freedom comes at a high risk to their physical safety. The probability is high that children could be raped or murdered while sleeping on the street, and this fear dictates how, when, and where they strategically plan to sleep as groups; yet this does not protect them from “death squads” armed with guns and no respect for the sanctity of life (Epstein, 1996; Rodwell & Cavalcanti, 1998; Hecht, 1998).

Violence and insecurity. Narratives about these groups of children “on” and “of” the street have shifted from an eyesore for local people to a threat in need of extermination, only marginalizing them to the farthest peripheries of society. Several cities in Brazil, Honduras, Guatemala and other countries, have histories of imprisoning street children as well as shooting them for sport. These “death squads” formed by self-proclaimed vigilantes, comprised of security and police forces work to fulfill these social demands (Campbell, 2003; Hecht, 2008, Koelma, 2014; Scanlon et al., 1998). While some of the children are certainly involved in illicit activity, they have been dehumanized to the point that law enforcers and society deem it acceptable to allow this sort of “social cleansing” at the end of gun (Campbell, 2003; Ghosh, 2013; J., 2014; Salazar, 2008; Scanlon et al., 1998; Williams, 2009). The stigma of the street is a powerful and pungent image that has served to further ostracize these children with sweeping generalizations, yet little effort has been made by authorities to understand the external forces that created this lifestyle. Their human security is practically non-existent as society views them as vermin in need of exterminating, and when the police feel that the justice system moves too slowly in prosecuting young criminals, assassination seems a more effective route to resolving the social epidemic of street children (Ghosh, 2013; Williams, 2009).

These children face the ignominy of undesirable urchins on the cusp of criminal behavior, if they have not already breached it. This onerous stigma makes them even more vulnerable, as it abandons them to the streets but manifests disparaging public opinions of their lives in the street. Their criminalized status sets them up for a future of illegal means while simultaneously relegating them to “second-class citizens” in their own countries. Often the way in which police and legal institutions handle street children

reflects the distinction of their lower social class, and their perceived value to society, which is arguably non-existent (Hecht, 1998; Offit, 2008; Salazar, 2008). While a criminal future is not far off for most street children, as petty thievery certainly has the potential to evolve into armed robbery, child street laborers fight against that label. Child street laborers are particularly careful to set themselves apart from the *maloqueros*, or bad street children, and always have the tools of their trade on hand to alert potential customers that they were ready to shine shoes, sell papers, or wash their cars (Offit, 2008). Working children in Brazil often echoed the adult's disparaging and violent remarks towards the children of the street, voicing explicit hopes that they would be killed or removed from society (Hecht, 1998). As the responses from the working children show, the label of "street child" is a dangerous yoke to bear that threatens their security, and certainly helps fuel the media and the public's fear concerning the desperate and vicious lifestyles they lead (Aptekar & Heinonen, 2003; Nieuwenhuys, 2001).

Violence in the street is a common occurrence, as is exemplified by the infamous "death squads." These extrajudicial killings by police and self-proclaimed vigilantes, and even drug lords, are easily sensationalized and reported to local and international publics. These "death squads" attack at sporadic times, and hardly a child on the street can deny knowing victims of their abuse. There are accounts of children fleeing from police when asked for identification cards, and consequently dying with bullet wounds to the back. Other times, these street children will pay police officers to protect them, but eventually are victimized in the most gruesome ways. Sometimes the murdered bodies of street children will be found mutilated and carelessly disposed of in the street or in suburban

areas, (Campbell, 2003; Ghosh, 2013; Long, 1990) other times people go missing never to be found (Poltonowicz, 2014).

Sexual abuse. Aside from the fatal physical violence of the streets, addictions to drugs and vulnerabilities to sexual violence are rampant among street children. Children often find busy public areas to sleep during the night so that they are less likely to be raped. While there are more street boys than girls, both genders indicated that rape was a prominent fear for them (Motala & Smith, 2003). The sex industry often forces children into prostitution, which is easily done considering how little they are protected in the street (Landers, 1988; Scanlon, Scanlon, & Lamaro, 1993). However, many children realize the lucrative advantages of engaging in transactional sex with adults in exchange for money or protection, and then usually engage in sexual relationships with fellow street children for comfort, belonging, or security (Scanlon et al., 1998).

Children are typically sexually active at very young ages as low as eight years old, yet do not understand the risk and dangers of promiscuity and are much more likely to be infected with HIV/AIDS or become pregnant with little or no prenatal care (Hecht, 1998; Motala & Smith, 2003; Vemula, 2005). Girls have greater potential to fall into prostitution, and consequently early motherhood is a fact of life. Despite how common it is, young girls are extremely ignorant concerning issues of pregnancy and infants, and it is not unusual for such a young girl to show little interest or affection towards her own baby. Young boys embrace the *machismo* culture of virility, and while they are proud to have fathered several children before the age of sixteen, most of them much prefer to play soccer and roam the streets freely than have an active role in parenting (Scanlon et al., 1993).

Psychological insecurity. While the physical violence is an assumed aspect of street life, these children also suffer psychological maiming that affects their development and growth (Chelala & de Roux, 1994). Their exposure to drugs, violence, and abuse coupled with negligent adult figures creates major inhibitions to trust others and healthily express emotions or affection. They also struggle with deep feelings of worthlessness and poor self-esteem, largely due to the prejudice they blatantly experience from the rest of society (Rizzini & Butler 2003; Salazar, 2008). They are distrustful (even among each other), suspicious, unreliable, and inconsistent, as medical researchers observed while gathering interviews at NGO sponsored outreach programs (Scanlon et al., 1993).

Their “freedom from want” is largely threatened as street children are stigmatized as undesirable unfortunates, but also marginalized as their needs are cast to the corners of society where they also reside (Salazar, 2008). Despite legal protections, adult citizens and many of those in power look at the children’s lack of health care, education, and physical integrity and merely shake their heads in resignation (Rodwell & Cavalcanti, 1998). In general their security is jeopardized by undulating access to resources like food, healthcare facilities, and personal and political protections. As the dregs of society they are not only ostracized, but also targeted for abuse or removal. Despite a Brazilian 1991 statute that forbade police to arrest street children on mere suspicion of theft, it is quite normal, and socially condoned, for police to temporarily arrest street children just before major holidays, festivals, or visiting political figures visit which would undoubtedly beckon larger crowds to the streets these children taint with their presence. Police use phrases like “fine-tooth combed operation” to name the removal of “lice” from the streets

for these events (Scanlon et al., 1993). This dehumanization of street children reflects society's lack of concern for the future of their future, and further epitomized by the abuse they face from authority figures with the support of the majority.

Development and Street Children

These developing states in Latin America face the struggle of modernizing and industrializing, yet while under the auspices of already developed states, which control the existing global political economy. Many critics of the hegemonic system lament the unequal development of the economy and inequalities of distribution perpetuated by neoliberal capitalism. Capitalism and neoliberalism praise the notion of individual hard work, but many policy implications have been criticized for undermining the state's responsibility to its citizens by distancing social services from the political agenda (Harvey, 2005; Smith, 2008). Further disadvantages heaped upon these developing states often come in the form of Structural Adjustment Programs and other conditional loans from the World Bank and the IMF, which typically demand restrictive austerity measures to decrease spending in health and educational services provided by the state budget. In addition to these social service cuts, they are further privatized and subsidies are removed from public utilities while foreign investment is virtually unimpeded and public sector spending diminishes (Offit, 2008). These austerity measures undoubtedly affect already impoverished and marginalized people disproportionately, and greatly threaten their human security on several levels (Ennew & Swart-Kruger, 2003; Haugerud, 2005; Hertz & Nadar, 2005).

Poverty and underdevelopment. Official UN reports and many scholars have established links between migration, land reform, drought, economic recession, violence, unemployment, chronic poverty, and the unequal distribution of wealth with the phenomenon of street children (Scanlon et al., 1998). While there are several factors that impact street children, one common theme is extreme poverty. Pre-existing poverty, only exacerbated by neoliberal capitalist policies, creates deeper problems as families migrate en masse to larger cities in search for work. State-wide underemployment pressures families to send their children to work instead of paying often costly fees to go to school, which turns young 7 to 15 year-olds into the main breadwinners for their family units. The decreased access to school, health care, and social services, in tandem with greater unemployment allow the divide between the rich and the poor to grow deeper and wider. This dramatic inequality of wealth and access to resources has influenced cultural norms surrounding childhood as well. For the rich, childhood is a privilege and luxury, but in the shantytowns and *favelas* of the poor, childhood is hardly different from adulthood and its accompanying strenuous responsibilities (Landers, 1988; Offit, 2008; Salazar, 2008).

This lack of development, and in some economic sectors underdevelopment of infrastructure or services, jeopardizes the human security of the population, especially those already marginalized through age, gender, or social status. The lack of economic development contributes to the factors that push children to street life, as it deprives them of social and economic opportunities to claim for better futures.

Social and structural pressure. These problems of despondent poverty have several levels that the International Labour Organization (ILO) defines in terms of immediate, underlying, and structural causes. Immediate level causes are motivations that

suddenly change the child's environment so that he or she has to find work or shelter in the street, such as: death, abandonment, abuse, or loss of income from an adult member. Underlying causes usually fall under the umbrella of chronic impoverishment, socialized cultural expectations, like young boys finding early "independence," or even the desire for material wealth. Structural problems are those related to structural adjustments, regional inequalities, social ostracism, and development shocks. These latter issues are far from the control of those they oppress, and makes it easy for others to explain the problem of abandoned street children on the failure of the family to stay together or provide for its children (Ennew & Swart-Kruger, 2003; Salazar, 2008; Vemula, 2005). Children are viewed as economic assets to their families, and either must contribute to the pool of resources to maintain it or leave to fend for themselves. The pressure of poverty and lack of social welfare influences poor families to raise their children into early independence (Aptekar, 1991; Neuhouser, 1998; Schwinger, 2007). Only the rich children experience the coveted right of childhood, and can be seen solely for their emotional value instead of as potential sources to increase shared income (Hecht, 1998).

Social norms and underdevelopment. Much of the socialization of these children both "on" and "of" the street suggests that early independence is not only normal, but encouraged. While some children are definitely rejected from their homes, most experience some sort of "passive abandonment," as defined by the Colombian author Cobos (1973). "Passive abandonment" is a social norm of child rearing amongst these poorer families that encourages the child to roam the neighborhood and find companionship outside the reign of their mothers. The areas that embrace this kind of child-rearing method include the poor in the Caribbean, Mexico, and Brazil, which have

historically had the highest percentages of street children in Latin America. Across these different communities, it seems that the transition to street life was a slow process, and the home remained a sort of “base” to which children returned frequently (Aptekar, 1991; Epstein, 1996). Many of the children returned home irregularly to give money or participate in family events, and may even claim their mother’s home as their own regardless of how little time they actually spend there (Hecht, 1998).

Part of “passive abandonment” is the fact that siblings assume much of the responsibility in raising younger children, and this encourages early independence for both the older nurturing sibling and the social growth of the younger child as they develop apart from the scrutiny and attention of adults. These families often keep three generations of women under the same roof to help rear children, yet despite the plethora of maternal eyes, these mothers raise their children, particularly the boys, to be independent of them at much earlier ages than the traditional European-type family. This matrifocal household runs under the leadership of the mother and often keeps the father figure as a distant or interchangeable member of the family. This is particularly common in communities where social stratification is prominent and where there are limited socioeconomic roles to which men can ascend. In Latin America, these types of families have existed since the 1700s when Spanish aristocrats and clergy members established clear lines to distinguish the property-owning elite from the poor. This distinction of wealth, birth, and even religion contributed to the different social class’s definitions of family structure, clearly favoring children born in marriage while making it difficult to rise above the stigma of the diminished value of the promiscuous poorer class (Aptekar, 1991; Heilborn & Cabral, 2011; Neuhouser, 1998; Schwartzman, 2000).

Some studies have revealed that developing apart from adults actually accelerated developmental stages (Aptekar, 1991), but others revealed that living on the street puts children at higher risk for developmental difficulties (Vemula, 2005). According to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, if children are constantly hungry or feel unsafe there is little chance for them to develop higher skills that lead to self-actualization or healthy esteem. These disadvantaged physiological states make them more vulnerable to harmful lifestyles, such as drugs, sexual exploitation, HIV/AIDS, or criminal tendencies in order to find security or sustenance from adults (Ennew & Swart-Kruger, 2003; Vemula, 2005).

“The street is not always the place of danger, while the home is not always the shelter from life's woes” (Rodwell & Cavalcanti, 1998, p. 40). This quote depicts the complex backdrop of the lifestyle of street children and their motivations to stay in the street or return home. This lack of attention at home leaves children feeling unprotected, which often drives them to the street in search of establishing a source of community that gives them what they think they need. This gradual process of leaving home for the street usually begins around ages seven to eleven, as children at this age begin to internalize social behavior and points of reference apart from their own experiences at home. Often they realize that they have unmet needs at home, and connections with other children already living in the street help forge that transition to street life. This subsequent lack of an adult figure allows children total freedom and no structure in development or daily life. While complete autonomy sounds thrilling for a child fleeing an abusive home, the street also presents dangers (Rizzini & Butler, 2003). The lack of development in economic and social sectors has negative repercussion in the personal experiences of street children. The fact that many leave home because the street is “better,” perhaps

because of abuse or the family's inability to financially support all its children, points to underdevelopment's pervasive impact on human security.

In comparison, considering the Western world of the Industrial Revolution, there are similarities in the use and exploitation of children laboring for families, yet these states have transformed the social acceptance of that trend. While child street and factory laborers were often orphans or children from desperate families, this social epidemic has since reversed itself. It took years of legislation in these Western states, but now there are several age limitations that restrict children working certain jobs and hours. These legal protections from dangerous and prolonged work in factories or mines, in tandem with more accessible education helped shrink the population of child street laborers (Wagner, 2002). The fact that it took decades of legal altercations to not only outlaw child labor but reshape society's view of "street urchins," testifies that this structural problem can be overcome though not easily.

A Case Study: Brazil

A former colony of Portugal, Brazil gained its independence in 1822, but maintained a monarchical government until it abolished slavery in 1888 and subsequently established a republic by military power in 1889. Coffee exporters dominated Brazil's political and economic activity until the populist leader, Getulio Vargas, rose to power in the 1930s. In 1985, the military regime peacefully handed power over to a civilian federal republic government that continues today. Today, Brazil is South America's leading economic and regional power and the seventh largest global economic power, although it is also has one the highest ratios of income inequality in the world (The World Factbook, 2014).

In the 1960s and 1980s, some 40 million rural families were forcibly relocated to the cities so that Brazil could develop the farmland into lucrative mining and logging industries for profit. Before this mass exodus of people, around 75% of Brazil's population was rural, but by 1991 that same percentage was now urban. Under the military regime, Brazil overextended itself with large-scale capital projects, borrowed heavily, experienced skyrocketing interest rates, and overall felt the arduous burden of debt, inflation, and recession. When the IMF stepped in with a loan, it was not surprising that strict austerity measures accompanied it. With these Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), Brazil's civilian government adopted neoliberal strategies to open trade, privatize industries, and cut public spending and public services (McCreery, 2001).

The mass rural-to-urban migration of so many families in such a short time frame, combined with austerity measures, greatly limited the available jobs in the cities. Families built their shanty homes or *favelas* in tight proximity to hundreds of other sojourners making a new life in the city. School was a costly luxury, both in terms of money and time. Parents often took their children with them to work in the streets as vendors or shoe shiners, and if parents had jobs, older siblings often became the caretakers of the home and younger children. These conditions took a toll on the family unit, and under or unemployed fathers often left, increasing statistics for single-mother households (Rizzini & Butler, 2003), and in worst-case scenarios abusive step-fathers entered the scene as well (McCreery, 2001). The economic underdevelopment made worse by the state through poor investment and the implementation of neoliberal structures, paved a destructive path to insecurity for the vast majority of Brazil's population.

An old problem. Since its Independence, Brazil has dealt with the problem of homeless and street children, and its legacy of child delinquency directly stems from its history of slavery. This history of slavery still taints the socially and politically repressed descendants today, as the vast majority of street children in Brazil are “brown” and “black,” and are the majority of those targeted by “death squads” (Rodwell & Cavalcanti, 1998; Williams, 2009). In the 1960s, street children were simply an affectionate part of the scenery in certain areas of the cities, but as the population flooded into urban areas and family ties disintegrated, people no longer found the inundation of street children charming or pitiable, but instead a threat to business and their safety (McCreery, 2001).

Once these numbers frightened local merchants and community members enough, “death squads” become a legitimate option to solve the social epidemic of street children by exterminating them. These *justiceiros* (literally “avengers”) are hired private vigilantes, often off duty police officers, who found murder a viable option. These men and their patrons felt that their response was justified due to the ineffectual political and judicial system of Brazil to control the crimes of the street children, and so needed to be handled in more effectual and expedient methods (Chelala & de Roux, 1994). Of course, their tactics only added to the already intense feelings of alienation, fear, and mistrust these children felt living on the outskirts of acceptable society, which only adds fuel to their hatred of authority figures (Scanlon et al., 1993). During the late 1990’s statistics found that 1000 street children died every year in Brazil, making that fourth deaths per day (McCreery, 2001).

Legislation to protect children. Brazil has ratified the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which promulgates the rights of children to be protected and

provided for, and agency as participants in the decisions that affect their lives (Moran & de Moura Castro, 1997). Brazil also adopted the 1990 Estatuto da Criança do Adolescente (Children and Adolescent's Statute) which outlines the basic rights of minors and the "obligation, defined as being everybody's, to prevent the occurrence of any threat or violation of children's and adolescents' rights" (UNICEF, 1990). The statute also outlines protections and provisions for children and adolescents in risky situations, like homelessness or child laborers (UNHCR, 2005). UNICEF called this statute "one of the most advanced pieces of national legislation on child rights," yet despite Brazil's progressive laws their implementation falls sorely short of effective measures (UNHCR, 2005).

It is ironic that Brazil subscribes to these impressive resolutions to promote children's rights and security, yet harbors one of the most dangerous environments and extrajudicial responses towards the very children they are meant to protect. The legislative and administrative authority of the government is undermined as the infamous "death squad's" killing sprees, and the community's payment of their actions, goes unchecked. The federal government then fails to prosecute these killers, which only silently approves of this behavior (Chelala & de Roux, 1994). This directly threatens the political security of children as laws and law enforcers fail to protect them, and at worst, are the active forces causing them harm.

The state itself suffers when such violence is tolerated and often encouraged. According to the political theorist Max Weber, the state maintains the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force inside its given territory (Weber, 1946), and when civilians and unruly policemen assume the organization and regulation of punishment

towards other citizens, the state's purpose is violated. The state loses validity and power when it allows such violence to continue unchecked, which only perpetuates the lucrative criminal behavior of *justiceiros* and the fearful existence of their adolescent targets (Epstein, 1996). The behavior of police authorities and vigilantes is not the only violence in the street, but it does set an example for the children to imitate as they frequently lash out at each other on the street and in prison (Hecht, 1998).

Violence and correctional facilities. Despite Brazil's legal documents concerning children's rights, street children have virtually no protection, as exemplified in the narratives of police arresting them for temporary detainment simply to clear the streets before major events (Scanlon et al., 1993). Since street children are targeted for violent and prejudiced acts, in the most extreme examples of murder, it is no surprise that their political security is threatened as many are arrested and carted off to correction facilities against their will. While legal documents technically prohibit this, no one intervenes to prevent illegal behavior carried out by the authorities (Epstein, 1996). Over the years these facilities have evolved from "confined models" that restricted children's freedom and exposure to the outside world, to more "open models" that permitted them to come and go as they pleased, the latter of which did not become the norm until the 1990s (Moran & de Moura Castro, 1997).

Many of these "closed" facilities have notorious reputations among street children, as their purpose was primarily to protect society from the growing numbers of neglected children bound to lead criminal lives. Children lived in constant fear of authorities dragging them to internment correctional facilities like FUNABEM/FEBEM (Fundacao Nacional/Estadual do Bem-Estar do Menor/ National/State Foundation for the

Well-being of Minors), which really served as “schools for crime” as young children were kept in confinement with older seasoned adult criminals. FEBEM served as a waiting room for children charged with crimes, and while legality stated children could not be kept longer than 45 days before their trial, many children were incarcerated far beyond that; and some younger children claimed they practically grew up inside its walls (Hecht, 1998; Rizzini & Butler, 2003). Most of these programs treat children like criminals, and abuse their physical security by torturing them, instead of offering programs that would effectively teach them useful skills to help them build a life off the street.

There is a long history of inhumane and brutal treatment of children, who were forcibly taken to these institutions for a variety of reasons, which is comparable to the treatment of bonafide adult criminals in prisons (Moran & de Moura Castro, 1997). Children have given accounts of the hierarchy among prisoners, such that after several detentions at facilities a prisoner can earn responsibility to run errands for the police officers and even torture other inmates. Other children tell of severe physical abuse by police, molestation by older inmates, and of several days spent in solitary confinement in windowless basement cellars. One of the common methods of torture conducted by police is called the “parrot’s perch,” in which one hangs the child upside-down, arms handcuffed around their bent legs hanging from a pole, much like a parrot would sit on a branch. While the child is defenselessly held in this position, they would drip bleach or Pine Sol into their nasal passages, and water if the child were “lucky.” While many street children are in fact murdered, the majority is actually killed by fellow street children or gang violence of some kind, and not by these “death squads” (Campbell, 2003; Hecht,

1998). According to one young girl in Brazil, “street children only have three futures: prison, insanity, or death” (Hecht, 1998, p. 144).

It was not until the 1990s, when children’s rights emerged as the norm and NGOs worked to create more “open models” that allowed children agency to decide if they wanted to participate in educational or rehabilitation programs (Hecht, 1998; Moran & de Moura Castro, 1997). With the rise of NGOs, non-profits, and church outreach programs, “confining” children in institutions devolved as these other non-federal entities reached out to the streets to better understand the children’s needs and offer more amenable approaches. Many NGOs adopt “street educator” roles that bring food and services to the children where they are, which can reach children normally seen as lost causes since they shun traditional institutions. These attempts to give children agency try to restore a sense of dignity and choice to the individual, which essentially tries to institutionalize the essence of human security in small ways. Local voices sometimes complain when certain talented and amiable educators attract mobs of street kids, which inconvenience vendors and storeowners, and inevitably attract children playing hookey who would otherwise be in school (Moran & de Moura Castro, 1997).

Help for the children? In recent years hundreds of NGOs, INGOs, and faith-based organizations have grown in these developing states, many of which target the street child populations. However, despite these benevolent institutions, few success stories exist to encourage current street children of a future apart from the shackles of the poverty into which they were born. This is evidenced by the accounts of the Brazilian street kids, who explained that they left many of these programs or safe places because they resented adults establishing rules, and for any kind of discipline meant to reform

them. Few stayed in such programs, and often only lingered long enough to get free food and clothes, or until a fight broke out between fellow street children, or they were chastised by adults (Hecht, 1998; Scanlon et al., 1993).

The fact that such programs fail to transform street life is not wholly a testament to bad methods, as some certainly help children succeed, but the fact that children's independence is so distinct from adult supervision or intervention that when "help" comes with rules it is better to stay in the street (Ennew & Swart-Kruger, 2003; Scanlon et al., 1998; Shanahan, 2003). Reform is limited by a child's taste for street life, but also his unbridled need for liberty (Rodwell & Cavalcanti, 1998). The street also offers an education that is useful to the children, however dangerous or unattractive it may seem to observers. Whether they are child street laborers learning the capitalistic rules of trade from older kiosk or shop owners (Offit, 2008), or child vagabonds perfecting the finesse of their pickpocketing skills, regular school rooms will not provide curriculum to advance these ambitions. Sometimes the very substance of the street is enough to keep them enticed and away from the potential education could offer, as many return to it despite help from third parties (Hecht, 1998). The "security" these children find in the street away from structured assistance programs reflects the lack of economic and human development that would allow them choices and comfort in their lives.

In more recent years, the popular President Lula da Silva has made progress in promoting more equitable resource and wealth distribution, attempting to grow a more prominent middle-class. Under his leadership the domestic market grew, and since 2003, over 20 million Brazilians have come out of poverty (The Economist, 2010). While many Brazilians praise his performance, it is uncertain how much his policy reforms have done

to help the marginalized population of street children. While Brazil has a large population of street children, the majority of poor families still live together in their homes.

Considering that these children are least likely to attend school anyways, and their evasive nature rooted in fear of authority (Hecht, 1998) it is not unreasonable to assume that they are largely unaffected by Lula's progressive politics that raised some of the working class out of poverty.

However, despite drawbacks and the simple fact that it is logistically implausible to expect to reach every single child in the streets, these NGO based organizations allow children the agency to choose if they want help and how long they will stay under the group's auspices. As addressed in the theory chapter, NGOs often "fill in the gaps" left by neoliberal policies that release the state from obligations to provide social services and benefits. While critics of neoliberalism argue that this only perpetuates the irresponsibility of state policies (Nieuwenhuys, 2001), others see the benefit in allowing third apolitical parties the flexibility to address issues on smaller local scales. There is fear that NGOs can be co-opted by the state (Epstein, 1996), and due to funding from political groups can lose their humanitarian mindset; but on the whole religious, humanitarian, and educational groups in Brazil have made the most impact when disconnected from political entities, which have abused the trust of the street children for decades (Hecht, 1998; Scanlon et al., 1993).

Conclusion

While Brazil has grown its economy well in the last few decades, and is Latin America's regional powerhouse, its inequitable distribution of wealth and resources is key to the poverty in which a large percentage of the population lives. Neoliberal policies

and austerity plans have reduced social welfare and services, which hurt the already poor and marginalized members of society more. Street children are some of the most marginalized and least cared for members of the community, and their security is threatened in nearly every broad and narrow way possible (Salazar, 2008). Their personal security is threatened by the overt physical violence they experience at the hands of vigilantes and state authorities, which is made worse considering the state to which they hold citizenship boasts some of the most progressive legislation concerning children's rights. While poverty is a core causal factor that pushes children into street life, other factors such as broken, neglectful, and abusive homes, unfavorable environments, and economic aspects play integral roles in this social phenomenon (Moran & de Moura Castro, 1997).

In addition to these factors, social prejudices and political apathy towards abusive behavior against the myriad of street children creates a toxic environment of mutual distrust and fear. Many scholars point to long-term solutions, which involved overhauling economic policies to provide better services for trade schools and accessible education (Epstein, 1996). Even more exhaustive is the need for equitable distribution of resources, and a change in local attitudes towards street children. Both the international and local communities need to recognize the need to institute protection for children, but also to actively pursue measures that will ensure children have options aside from begging, working, and living in the street (Rodwell & Cavalcanti, 1998; Scanlon et al., 1993). The human security of these children is contingent upon their government and communities taking up the mantle to protect them from home-made threats such as extrajudicial

violence and unforgiving and underdeveloped economic policies that oppress poverty-stricken families.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

Overview of Main Concepts

Child soldiers are defined as “children (boys and girls) under the age of 18 who become part of a regular or irregular armed force or group in any capacity, including in roles of cooks, porters, human shields, sexual slaves, messengers, spies, or frontline combatants” (UNICEF, 2001). “Push” and “pull” factors come in a variety of forms, and serve as structural and cultural forces that bring children to the role of soldier. “Push” factors are rooted in the need for food, physical security, and health care, escape from forced marriages (for girls), or from death or separation of family members. “Pull” factors are fixed around desire for revenge; desire to join family already fighting; or feelings of patriotic altruism to save fellow victims (Betancourt et al., 2008; Francis, 2007). “Push” factors link directly to lack of human security felt by these children, and when they are so entrenched in poverty that hunger and the need to survive from warring factions stipulates life decisions, they truly have no choice in the matter. Other times “pull” factors work in tandem with “push” factors, but even in the event that children join early of their own volition, desire for revenge or greed is largely motivated by structural problems created by lack of economic development and oppressive social structures.

In the specific case of Sierra Leone, a corrupt patrimonial government made ineffective by failing economic structures created the perfect openings for a civil war to emerge (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; Hick, 2001), and subsequently removed any sort of protection of its citizens, particularly those of children. The children were threatened both in terms of “narrow” and “broad” security, stemming from physical violence against their persons and lack of opportunities aside from dangerous lifestyles with armies.

Street children are distinguished between being “on” or “of” the street. Those “on” the street are mostly child laborers who work there, but maintain ties with family. Children “of” the street live, work, and sleep in the street with limited to no interaction with family (UNICEF, 2005). There are common factors that push children to street life, many of whom claim poverty as the driving force to find work at such young ages instead of attending school or staying at home. Abusive or negligent homes, lack of funds to attend school, friends or siblings already living in the street, and the allure of an independent life in the street are some of the main denominators that bring children to an existence “of” and “on” the streets (Hecht, 1998; Motala & Smith, 2003).

Many of these factors like poverty and inaccessible education for already marginalized groups living in *favelas*, point to economic underdevelopment. In Brazil’s case, the dramatic inequality of wealth affects the majority of the population in negative ways, keeping marginalized poor working classes burdened by neoliberal policies meant to restrict government spending through social services (Harvey, 2005; McCreery, 2001). While not all poor children turn to the streets for opportunities, those that do are generalized as criminals and “second class” citizens (Salazar, 2008), in need of extermination or at the least to be moved away from the general public’s line of sight. Their political and personal security is often abused through physical violence and forced relocation to facilities meant to help them, but arguably cause more emotional and physical damage in the process. While hunger or poverty threaten a “narrower” view of their human security, social prejudices and lack of political protection threaten “wider” aspects, as they practically have no opportunity to develop a life above the squalor into which they are born. As the case studies of Sierra Leonean child soldiers and Brazilian

street children show, children are a particularly vulnerable group in need of protection from those who wish to exploit and harm them.

Implications of Linking Security and Development

Human security is often criticized for its vague and broad nature (Paris, 2001), but in order for it to truly exist for the individual, security must include a spectrum of aspects that support both “narrow” and “broad” concepts. While narrower aspects speak directly to physical security and seek to protect individuals from violence against their person, wider aspects incorporate concerns around human development, the environment they live in, and health provisions. The wider aspect strives to provide security by offering choices for people to make in their daily lives, and extending into economic, political, and personal realms (Buzan & Hansen, 2009).

While the narrower view of human security is arguably more pertinent to implement, as it provides for the immediate needs for survival, a comfortable life in which the individual can decide for him or herself how to invest their energy and skill is built in a broader idea of security. Essentially, underdevelopment limits choices, virtually eradicating broader human security factors, and severely threatening narrower aspects. Security and development are linked as complementary, yet separate entities. In a worst-case political maelstrom, insecurity undermines development and economic wellbeing, while underdevelopment compromises human security (Howe & Sims, 2011). Some of the more direct consequences of this underdevelopment for human security are evidenced in the poor quality of life and shortened lifespans of those surviving in destitute conditions (King & Murray, 2002).

The UNDP report in 1997 focused on human development, and went so far as to define poverty in terms of denying choices and opportunities for living a tolerable life (1997). Extreme poverty is a major concern in development literature, as it subjugates people to a life of interminable struggling in order to barely maintain their own livelihood. Such widespread and chronic poverty usually lingers if a state's governing apparatus is weak or corrupt, and can lead to violent conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998) and/or social stratification at the expense of those at its bottommost rung (Landers, 1988; Nieuwenhuys, 2001). This poverty keeps the marginalized voices that would otherwise criticize the structures at a barely audible whisper, striking no fear in the hearts of politicians who could make a difference, while simultaneously ensuring their vulnerable status by removing social services, like free or accessible health care and education (Thomas, 2001; Tripp et al., 2013).

Security and development are linked, for when one is absent the other suffers. In the case study of Sierra Leone, once the state failed to provide economic and political security, which would include job opportunities and safety from external violence (development factors), the spark caught flame and violent conflict ensued, leaving the population, especially children, at the mercy of warring factions (security factors) (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; Englehart, 2009; Murshed, 2003). While the ultimate goal of human security is to create sustainable development for current and future generations while embracing the agenda of freedoms from “want” and “fear” (Howe & Sims, 2011), this goal seems particularly daunting in light of the poverty and social structures that make narrow human security difficult to ensure. When these pervasive problems are intertwined with socially accepted injustice towards those most affected by conflict and

poverty, the toxic combination makes peace and security a fleeting reality (Poku et al., 2007).

Brazil exemplified this link between security and development in the case of its lack of employment opportunities, and the eventual disintegration of family units because of the extraneous pressure and frustration of poverty. While poverty cannot be solely blamed for the collapse of most family units, it was a commonplace response when most were asked about why their families were ruptured or why they wanted to leave them for the street (McCreery, 2001; Rizzini & Butler, 2003).

Practicality of Linking Security and Development

Considering that security and development have legitimate connections that are useful in establishing human security, their relationship is important to understand. Distinguishing and building upon this connection helps give a causal explanation of why insecurity and underdevelopment are so problematic around the world. Often, human security is best defined by its very absence. When the lack of provision in security concerns like health care, education, or foodstuffs is blatant, the milieu of insecurity is tangible and obvious. Human security and development approaches point to structural forces, like weak institutions and rampant poverty, as causal factors that lend themselves to perpetuating the vicious cycle of inequality and insecurity (Howe & Sims, 2011; Thomas, 2001).

In justifying the importance of human security, one can juxtapose the developed states that embrace ideas of human rights and security compared to those developing states that fail to institute provisional measures to protect and secure their populations. As evidenced by the “push” and “pull” factors of child soldiers and the influences that

brought children to street life, extreme poverty combined with lack of development and opportunities leads to insecurity (Poku et al., 2007). Street children embody this, as they flee homes to live in the dangerous street, while they claim to experience “freedom” from adults and the chance to make money, it comes with deadly threats to their wellbeing. If development were robust, their security would not be threatened by seeking a “better” life in the street (Landers, 1988; Offit, 1998).

Benefits and Drawbacks of Connecting Security and Development

Human security and development highlight the individual’s need for security, but also point to the structural problems that inhibit development that properly allow for a society to economically prosper and benefit its citizens. In striving for this peaceful environment, in which all citizens enjoy human security, survival is no longer the sole concern of the state, but now can move into a position where the state can improve the overall quality of life. As a society grows and develops it can also afford to invest in more hospitals, doctors, welfare institutions, schools, and other social services, which all in turn benefit the security of the individual (Howe & Sims, 2011).

While human security does make the individual the referent object of security, it by no means overlooks the importance of state security. In fact, when the individual is made secure, the state likewise benefits (Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Roberts, 2005). The state is also seen as an integral player in resolving many issues concerning human security. Within the 1994 UNDP document, sustainability across economic sectors requires both national and global policies. States need to find balances between the efficient and competitive markets and “the legal and regulatory frameworks that only governments can provide,” as well as “the investments to enhance the capabilities of all

and the provision of social safety nets for those with unequal access to the markets” (p. 21). The state receives most of the direction regarding policy and change, yet it is for the ultimate purpose of securing individuals within those states. While individual underdevelopment is a major concern, the burden is on the state to rise above restrictive underdevelopment to provide human security for its citizens, so there is a sense of priority between the state and its individuals.

For example, human security includes the notion of health when qualifying how men and women should be secure. If HIV/AIDS is an unaddressed issue, whether no health professionals exist to care for patients or social norms virtually prohibit the dissemination of useful information and preventive measures, individuals suffer in fatal ways. Usually, those infected with the deadly virus, die in the prime years of their lives, which subsequently takes away a large population of working members of society, parents for children, and deprives the economy of skills that took a lifetime to hone. This is just one illustration of how destructive and costly these security concerns can become when they continue unabated due to lack of development, and the need to prioritize the state as it then works to provide security for its population (Poku et al., 2007).

While human security’s goal is to secure people, it gives little direction to policymakers due to its vague and widely inclusive definition. This is a core critique to human security, but a valid one. While it allows academics room to broaden the scope of research relating to threats to humanity, this likewise invites much criticism (Paris, 2001). This debate surrounding academic fields of human security seeps into political agendas, and its critiques argue that it makes the tools of policymaking dull and blunt as few can decide what constitutes a viable threat and how best to treat it (Buzan & Hansen, 2009;

Roberts, 2005). Underdevelopment can make the most vulnerable people suffer even more by denying basic human needs like food and clean water, but development itself can sometimes prove problematic.

Underdevelopment has clear negative implications that increase human insecurity, but sometimes development programs can have destructive consequences themselves. While development programs are meant to raise people out of abject poverty, they can inadvertently cause damage. For example, neoliberal economic policies were meant to redirect finances through loans and austerity measures in developing states, and by promoting individual work ethics, eventually raise the populace to a higher standard of living. While this undoubtedly made some rich, it also widened the gap between the rich and poor, while removing social services that were vital to the most marginalized. This intended aid for development often made living conditions worse for the poor (Duffield, 2014; Harvey, 2005; Howe & Sims, 2011).

Lack of development is particularly evidenced by the DDR camps in Sierra Leone, and how few there are to properly service the thousands of children who need psychological and emotional counseling, as well as educational and vocational training. While the programs strive to help rehabilitate children as best they can, the numbers of individuals who cannot go through such programs are significant (Wessells, 2005). Many children are not eligible to find jobs or attend schools until they complete the rehabilitation programs offered by NGOs or state institutions. While these programs strive to help rebuild the lives of those children traumatized by their participation in war, they only reach a very small percentage of those in need, often denying care and benefits to those who are unable to participate due to a variety of reasons (Dupuy, 2011; Kim,

2006). Education programs and DDR facilities are also costly, and staffing is difficult to maintain for lack of adequate pay, which stems from development issues in Sierra Leone and ultimately negatively affects the security of the most vulnerable in need of its services (Betancourt et al., 2008).

Influencing Policy

With an acute sense for the individual's needs in security and development, policymakers working through the lens of human security can focus on improving structures that provide education and social services. Human security seeks to provide for all individuals, but has most effectively brought attention to the marginalized populations of societies and addressed their need for immediate provision of development and security programs. However, the policymaking realm must decide what groups need attention and how best to implement such programs (Howe & Sims, 2011). Some scholars argue that democracy is key to success in promoting development and security, as public support and political participation are necessary to truly establish these concepts and grow them effectively (Poku et al., 2007; Thede, 2008). Regardless of the political structure, development, as linked with human security, should foster environments of peace and progress.

States should strive to diversify their economies, as Collier and Hoeffler's argument finds that states with only primary commodity exports are more likely to suffer internal conflict (2004). With more robust economies that can export a variety of goods and services, individuals are likely to benefit in the public sector while poverty is likely to reduce (Poku et al., 2007). Policy should strive to keep the individual at the center of

its agenda, and by improving the development of the state and economy, the individual should benefit in security and opportunity.

In the specific examples of child soldiers and street children, preventative measures are key to mitigating threats against their security. For child soldiers particularly, living in a warzone provides opportunities to become soldiers that would not exist in peaceful stable states (Faulkner, 2001). Ideally, the complete prevention of wars and conflict would provide security, and while this notion is utopian there are steps that can certainly be taken towards this goal. Promoting more equitable distribution of wealth, development in multiple sectors of production, stopping the proliferation of weapons across borders, and the unchecked exploitation of valuable resources in war-ravaged areas are all long-term potential solutions to promoting peace and development (Hick, 2001).

While these issues link with structural problems, like weak institutions and economies, more immediate solutions are needed to address the damage already inflicted. These DDR camps only reach a small percentage of child soldiers in need, while the majority of schools in Sierra Leone do not provide any psychosocial services necessary to help rehabilitate children traumatized by war. Some scholars call for communities to be equipped so that they are able to provide such services well after NGOs and emergency support have left (The Dallaire Initiative, 2014). Preventing isolation and stigmatization of these children is essential to helping them reintegrate into society, in addition to teaching them marketable skills that can set them up for a livelihood (Betancourt et al., 2008).

For street children, the need for more equitable distribution of resources and wealth is at the heart of their fight against poverty. While long-term structural changes like economic agendas or even social attitudes towards impoverished children are vital to improving conditions, short-term solutions are important to address present needs. Many institutions exist as a result of progressive legislation, yet facilities meant to help children have a long history of abuse. Continuing along the recent trends of “open” facilities that allow children to choose to participate in educational and health programs have proved more effective than their precursors (Hecht, 1998).

Overall, governments need to be held accountable for the abuse that happens to their citizens, however young or stigmatized, and prevent authorities from continuing their oppressive behavior that often culminates in violent contact with the children (Chelala & de Roux, 1994; Scanlon et al., 1993). Most of the policy implications are long-term based solutions that seek to transform deeply rooted prejudices and propensities for violence as a means to resolve or repress conflict (Zambelli, 2002). While policymakers should strive to keep the individual at the center of reforms, they also should seek to empower local people and institutions to claim responsibility and ownership of the changes occurring in their communities.

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