Electronic Theses and Dissertations



Document Type


Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy


Civil Engineering

Committee Chair

Michail Gkolias

Committee Member

Claudio Meier

Committee Member

Sabya Mishra

Committee Member

Thalis Zis


Both the industry/commercial community and academic circles have long recognized the necessity for developing an efficient and dependable system for allocating berth and quay slots at seaports. The majority of scholarly articles, however, deal with container ports, where berth allocation is often done on a first-come, first-served basis and/or based on long-term contracts. Although the berth allocation problem has been extensively studied and documented, it seems that few studies have been published with reference to auctions as the primary method of efficiently allocating berthing timeslots at passenger terminals. Previous studies have recognized the advantages that game theory and auctions have to offer in designing an efficient berth allocation scheme. The remaining question is whether, in the context of public berth allocation, it is more beneficial to employ a sequential item auction as opposed to a bundle auction. The goal of this study is to design different types of auction mechanisms in order to maximize the port operator’s profits under different assumptions of supply and demand and compare them for their efficiency. The results from this study can be used by terminal operators, given their knowledge and/or assumptions on slot valuations and demand, to select a winner-determination policy and auction mechanism when designing their berth scheduling to maximize their profits.


Data is provided by the student.

Library Comment

Dissertation or thesis originally submitted to ProQuest


Open Access