Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Date

2025

Document Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Arts

Department

Political Science

Committee Chair

Dursun Peksen

Committee Member

Elizabeth Wellman

Committee Member

Nicole Detraz

Abstract

Autocratic leaders face a constant challenge in balancing loyalty and competence when appointing ministers. While existing research suggests that autocrats favor loyalty to mitigate threats, this study investigates how they adjust their preferences based on the nature of threats they face. Using several datasets covering 41 autocratic countries from 1980 to 2016, this research applies a two-way fixed effects panel regression to analyze the strategic trade-off between loyalty and competence in cabinet appointments. It argues that autocrats systematically prioritize loyalty over political competence in response to internal threats. In contrast, during external threats, autocrats favor technically competent ministers over loyalty. To further illustrate these dynamics, I include two illustrative examples of Iran and China, analyzing key periods of internal and external threats. While the loyalty-competence trade-off has been widely discussed, this study systematically examines its variation in response to different types of threats, offering broader insight into authoritarian resilience.

Comments

Data is provided by the student.

Library Comment

Dissertation or thesis originally submitted to ProQuest.

Notes

Embargoed until 05-06-2026

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Available for download on Wednesday, May 06, 2026

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