Joint attention in joint action
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the role of intention and joint attention in joint actions. Depending on the shared intentions the agents have, we distinguish between joint path-goal actions and joint final-goal actions. We propose an instrumental account of basic joint action analogous to a concept of basic action and argue that intentional joint attention is a basic joint action. Furthermore, we discuss the functional role of intentional joint attention for successful cooperation in complex joint actions. Anika Fiebich is PhD student in Philosophy at the Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany. Shaun Gallagher is Lilian and Morrie Moss Professor of Philosophy at the University of Memphis, USA. © 2013 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.
Publication Title
Philosophical Psychology
Recommended Citation
Fiebich, A., & Gallagher, S. (2013). Joint attention in joint action. Philosophical Psychology, 26 (4), 571-587. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2012.690176
