Sync-ing in the stream of experience: Time-consciousness in Broad, Husserl, and Dainton
By examining Dainton's account of the temporality of consciousness in the context of long-running debates about the specious present and time consciousness in both the Jamesian and the phenomenological traditions, I raise critical objections to his overlap model. Dainton's interpretations of Broad and Husserl are both insightful and problematic. In addition, there are unresolved problems in Dainton's own analysis of conscious experience. These problems involve ongoing content, lingering content, and a lack of phenomenological clarity concerning the central concept of overlapping experiences. Copyright © Shaun Gallagher 2003.
Gallagher, S. (2003). Sync-ing in the stream of experience: Time-consciousness in Broad, Husserl, and Dainton. Psyche, 9 Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.memphis.edu/facpubs/6379