Distance Relativism and the Limits of Moral Assessment: Fricker and Williams.
Abstract
Distance relativism (Williams, 1975, 1985) can be distinguished from other ethical relativisms in two ways. First, moral assessment is appropriate between contemporary societies and those of the recent past. Second, where moral assessment is not appropriate, the distance relativist practices quietism. Fricker (2010) critiques Bernard Williams’s (1975, 1985) distance relativism, claiming it fails to deliver the intended results regarding which societies we can appraise. Here, I address Fricker’s critique and present a novel interpretation of Williams’s idea of ‘outlooks,’ showing that Fricker’s criticisms are not insurmountable.
Publication Title
Philosophia
Recommended Citation
Gray, D. M. (2024). Distance Relativism and the Limits of Moral Assessment: Fricker and Williams.. Philosophia, 52, 1153-1163. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00782-w
Comments
When to morally assess contemporary and past societies is a question of perpetual interest. Bernard Williams’s account of ‘distance relativism’ (1975, 1985) attempts to provide a framework for understanding when moral assessment of past and present societies is appropriate. Fricker (2010) has launched a compelling challenge to Williams’s view, questioning its internal coherence. Fricker argues that the test Williams provides to determine which contemporary or past societies are subject to moral assessment does not give us the results Williams desired. I will argue that Williams has the resources to address Fricker’s challenges.