Epistemic reactive attitudes
Abstract
Although there have been a number of recent discussions about the emotions that we bring with us to our epistemic endeavors, there has been little, if any, discussion of the emotions we bring with us to epistemic appraisal. This paper focuses on a particular set of emotions, the reactive attitudes. As Peter F. Strawson and others have argued, our reactive attitudes reveal something deep about our moral commitments. a similar argument can be made within the domain of epistemology. Our "epistemic reactive attitudes" reveal our epistemic commitments. Reflection on the role they play in our practice of epistemic appraisal can contribute to a number of different debates in contemporary epistemology, including the nature of epistemic norms and epistemic responsibility.
Publication Title
American Philosophical Quarterly
Recommended Citation
Tollefsen, D. (2017). Epistemic reactive attitudes. American Philosophical Quarterly, 54 (4), 353-366. Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.memphis.edu/facpubs/6236
