The Time to Defect: The Game Theory in International Treaties

Identifier

44

Author

Andrew Schrack

Date

2015

Document Type

Honors Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelor of Arts

Major

Political Science

Committee Chair

Leah Windsor

Abstract

Why are some international treaties more durable than others or more likely to elicit cooperation from the actors? In this paper, treaties are categorized into four models to assess how their institutional design affects whether or not states are likely to uphold their terms. The shadow of the future and institutional design both feature prominently in the international relations literature and this work contributes by specifying the variables of treaties that affect their durability and likelihood of cooperation. I argue that the degree of monitoring and whether or not the treaty is renewable affect states' incentives to uphold the terms of the agreement. A central tenet of these models is that the incentives change over the timeline of the treaty based on the shadow of the future and how much the party has already cooperated in this treaty.

Comments

Undergraduate Honor's Thesis

Library Comment

Honors thesis originally submitted to the Local University of Memphis Honor’s Thesis Repository.

Recommended Citation

Schrack, Andrew, "The Time to Defect: The Game Theory in International Treaties" (2015). Honors Theses. 28.
https://digitalcommons.memphis.edu/honors_theses/28